Daily Report

East Europe

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UPPSH Sees 'Conflicts' If Kosovo Unresolved

AU0301194096 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian 29 Dec 95 p 4

[Report by N. Misini: "The Albanians Cannot Be Patient Indefinitely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Albanian Political Parties [Unioni i Partive Politike Shqiptare—UPPSH], made up of the National Unity Party, the People's Party, and the Mitrovica-based Republican Party, held its first news conference in Prishtina yesterday, given according to rotation by People's Party Chairman Milaim Kadriu. He first announced that the union had been founded on 14 December, and at present consists of three parties. A 12-member management council has been created, with four members from each party.

These three parties consider the foundation of the UPPSH to be a positive step in attempting to unite different parties with the same programs into a single body that will be able to make a greater contribution than any single party. Kadriu went on to emphasize that it is evident that division into many parties has not been very beneficial at a time when the Albanians are struggling for liberation. He went on to expound on the political situation in Kosova, which he said is still burdened by Serbian repression. While the international community holds conferences on the former Yugoslavia, the totalitarian Belgrade regime is not easing up its violence against the Albanians. Because Kosova has been ignored at these internationally organized meetings, we insist on a separate international conference to be held on Kosova.

A failure to reach a fast solution to the question of Kosova and any delay in this solution will provoke discontent among the Albanian civil population, inexorably leading to conflicts which will show the international community that Bosnia was easier than the problem of the Albanians.

The UPPSH asked publicly why the official policy of Albania in international diplomacy is to seek a kind of autonomy for Kosova. In the end, the UPPSH said, we do not think that the initiative to hold a Balkan conference is right, because we think it may reduce the Albanian question to a problem of minorities. In addition, the idea of a solution "acceptable to everyone" is inadmissible, because politically it means equating the occupier with the occupied and the hangman with his victim, because it is well-known that Serbia is the occupier of Kosova.

The UPPSH asked the Academies of Science of Albania and Kosova to commit themselves directly to the national cause, because the burden of drawing up a pan-national strategy falls on them. These academies should also issue various publications about the Albanian question and send them to international institutions.

As usual, only the correspondent of RILINDJA was at this news conference, because, as was said, the correspondents of the Kosova Information Center, Albanian Radio-Television, and other radio and television networks saw no point in coming, despite the invitations sent to them in time.

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Russia's Zhirinovskiy Pays 'Secret Visit' to Varna

AU0501123996 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 3 Jan 96 p 1

[STANDART NEWS staff report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Varna—According to informed sources, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, made a secret visit to Varna on the eve of the New Year. Flying in his private aircraft from Western Europe to Russia, he touched down at Varna Airport, where he reportedly met with prominent businessmen and heads of Bulgarian-Russian companies, especially those engaged in the petroleum sector.

According to reports, agreement was reached for Zhirinovskiy to act as middle man in brokering a big deal between a private company in Varna and a state company in the CIS.

The Russian nationalist placed an order for the express printing of visiting cards. Vladimir Volfovich liked the work of the Protokol publicity company and reportedly asked them to submit an offer for supplying him with election campaign materials for the Russian presidential elections.

Orion Head Denies Links With Videnov Government

AU0501121596 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 3 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[24 CHASA staff report: "Takeover in Orion?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new boss of Orion Ltd. is Nikolay Krivoshiev. The company forms the nucleus of the notorious group bearing the same name and has registered its new headquarters in Lovech. Rumen Spasov, Orion's head until now, reportedly now has no connections with the company, according to a statement by the businessman Krivoshiev, known as "the lamb king," on 2 January to the Lovech weekly STREMLENIE. Krivoshiev claimed that Andrey Lukanov is behind the attacks on Orion, adding that Lukanov is seeking to topple Zhan Videnov by flexing his economic muscle, thus winning political power as well.

Orion Commerce Ltd. was formed by Rumen Mirchev Spasov in 1990. Originally it was engaged in agricultural production and trading. Later, other companies were created, all of them stars with names including that of the eponymous constellation. Many of them are owned personally by Rumen Spasov and Nikolay Krivoshiev.

"Lukanov and Ananieva are transitory phenomena who have ended up in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] by chance. They are a mistake of the party and its chief problem," Krivoshiev told the Lovech weekly. "Vladimir Topencharov was speaking out of turn at the wrong time when he declared that Orion was harmful to the party. If anything is bad for the party, it is all the old has-beens, who should be purged from the BSP," Krivoshiev commented. He said that the people in Orion had received nothing from the BSP except insults.

"We do not have the support of the government or the prime minister; it is merely that our goals coincide," Krivoshiev said. According to him, proof of this was the formation of the Bulgarian Agricultural and Industrial Bank. "We want to develop agriculture through this bank and this is what infuriates them," he said, "because if we have strong agriculture, we will also have a strong government. However, certain people do not want this and do not like Zhan Videnov, but his government will remain in office for a long time. If it falls, the BSP will no longer govern this country," Krivoshiev predicted. As an individual businessman, he holds 49 percent of the shares in Duma Press Ltd. Stefan Prodev [DUMA's editor in chief] has accused him of dubious deals and of serving Orion's interests.

SDS Motion of No Confidence Over 'Grain Crisis'

AU0501120096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 5 Jan 95

[Report by Zlatina Georgieva from the National Assembly in Sofia—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] At 1103 hours this morning, the leaders of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] parliamentary group submitted to the National Assembly Business Office a motion for a draft resolution of no confidence in Prime M...ster Zhan Videnov and the entire Bulgarian cabinet, for its decision to release grain and flour for export without guaranteeing supplies for domestic consumers' needs. In the reasons for submitting the motion, it is stated that the development of the grain crisis and the failures in grain and flour deliveries to towns and populated areas has caused difficulties for the population, and private bakers face the risk of bankruptcy. This makes it necessary, the motion continues, to ask whether this is not a situation that the government artificially created. Further on, the motion states, and I quote: The situation that has arisen is indicative of the government's complete incapacity, not only to get the situation under control, but even to explain it.

The motion is signed by 76 National Assembly deputies from the parliamentary groups of the SDS, People's Union, and the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] and three independent deputies. The opposition is demanding a special session of parliament, which un-

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der the National Assembly's regulations, must be convened by the National Assembly chairman within seven days of submission of the no-confidence motion, which means that we can expect the debate to be held by 12 January at the latest.

At an improvised news briefing arranged after the no-confidence motion was submitted, Deputies Yordan Sokolov, Ekaterina Mikhaylova, and [name indistinct] said that after the grain crisis, during the spring we can expect a crisis with animal feed supplies, because much of the grain exported was feed grain, and so the farmers will have nothing to give their animals. They emphasized that it is impermissible to encroach upon the state grain reserves, which are intended only for emergency situations, and added that the conditions are very unfavorable at the moment for importing the grain that the country needs.

Yambol Business Block Members Join New Democracy

AU0501130596 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 3 Jan 96 p 3

[STANDART NEWS staff report: "Yambol Business Block Organization Joins New Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yambol—Members of the Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB] in the town are leaving the regional BBB organization and joining New Democracy, active party members report. New Democracy plans to officially establish its local organization in Yambol on 10 January, when New Democracy Chairman Nikolay Kisyov and National Assembly Deputies Ivo Traykov and Dr. Orlin Draganov [who left BBB to form New Democracy] will attend the inaugural meeting. The new converts have sent a written request to the leadership of the Greek New Democracy Party, asking them not to give any more money to George Ganchev [BBB leader]. According to the defectors, the Greek party has given Ganchev $60,000 for his presidential election campaign. They claim that Ganchev has already spent the money on building his new villa in the Burgas village of Rezovo.

The new party believes that it has every chance of displacing the SDS from the opposition scene in Bulgaria.

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Republic Signs Border Treaty With Slovakia

LD0401124696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jan Ruml and Ludovit Hudek, the interior ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, signed in Zidlochovice [south Moravia] today a treaty on the joint state border. Our Brno correspondent Bohumir Mazac reports:

The Czech Government approved the draft treaty on 15 November. According to this, the border should be shortened from the present 285 km to 261 km. The law envisages the exchange of altogether 452 hectares of territory between the two states in order to achieve a logical border.

This treaty, however, has a number of opponents, above all, from the ranks of the inhabitants of the villages which will thus fall on the territory of the other state. This involves, above all, a part of the village of Javornik, specifically the settlement U Sabotu, which should be under the administration of the Slovak Republic, although the majority of the inhabitants, according to the mayor, want to stay on the Czech side of the border. On the contrary, the inhabitants of the second controversial village of Sidonie should become citizens of the Czech Republic.

Mayor Says Treaty 'Illegal'

LD0501094696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 5 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Martin Kruzica, mayor of Javornik, has described the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's signing of the treaty defining the border between the two states as an illegal move. The disputed settlement of U Sabotu, which is to be transferred to Slovakia, lies within the boundaries of Javornik. According to the mayor, 63 percent of the inhabitants of U Sabotu claim Czech nationality. The Javornik local council has lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court because, under the charter of fundamental human rights and freedoms, no one may be expelled from their country.

Denmark Signs Military Cooperation Memorandum

LD0401181896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The defense ministers of Denmark and the Czech Republic have signed a memorandum on military cooperation between the two countries in Prague. The cooperation will primarily involve informing one another about strategic and tactical problems in the building up of their armies, as well as about planning defense resources and ecological activities.

Klaus Discusses Topical Economic Issues

AU0401192696 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 2 Jan 96 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Pavel Richter and Martin Jasminsky; place and date not given: "Political and Social Influences Would Be More Likely To Slow Down Economic Growth"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The 6.3-percent rise in the GDP in the third quarter is unexpectedly high. Do you think that the Czech Republic can attain such high growth over the longer term and what kind of conditions have to be created for this?

[Klaus] The partial economic indicators are telling us that economic growth is undoubtedly speeding up. The data for the third quarter was not—in keeping with this—a surprise; the only surprise was its specific value. On the supply side, our economy has no explicit restrictions that would slow down economic growth and I see no reason why there would be a slowing down from the point of view of the demand factors. If I were to look for possible reasons for a certain deviation from this tendency, then I would be more likely to see them in factors outside the economy, let us say in political or social factors.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Some economists are saying that we have to reach an even higher level if we want to catch up with the advanced states.

[Klaus] I am not going to quibble about the estimates between 4.5 and 5.5 percent. It is necessary to achieve rates of growth that will be visibly higher than the average in the OECD countries, which I do indeed envisage. This has two elements—one is the growth of the nominal product and the other of the real product. We have already achieved a certain statistical stability from the point of view of our own material basis. There is, however, a major problem with price deflators or, to put it differently, with those statistical price indexes with whose aid the nominal GDP rise is translated into real values. We have many reasons to believe that the price deflators are exaggerated. This is not intended as criticism of anyone; it is technically a terribly difficult statistical matter. When I see that we are constantly quoting GDP growth in 1984 actual prices, then this is probably not too realistic an initial price base. Therefore, I think that the actual growth may be—for some time already—a little higher than the statistics indicate. We have carried out several experimental calculations and it is apparent that the price deflators may indeed be exaggerated.

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[HOSPOD SKE NOVINY] You mentioned extraeconomic infl ices that could have a negative impact on the pace of GDP...

[Klaus] Not exclusively on the pace of GDP, but on the whole of economic stability and equilibrium. It is clear that if we were to produce many Dr. Rath's [head of the doctors' trade union who led the recent strike] and many aggressive opposition politicians, then—I believe—we could calmly wave goodbye to the Czech Republic's unique stability.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] In your opinion, is redistribution through the state budget six years after 1989 sufficiently low, or could it decrease more rapidly? We ask in the knowledge that the share of public expenditure for this year has been reduced only negligibly.

[Klaus] I would envisage a more visible and rapid reduction in the share of the state budget, and of public finances in general, in GDP. I am generally in favor of a further reduction in this share, but the level of courage for this is always relative. A more marked reduction could perhaps be made. But, we have to submit the state budget to parliament at the end of September, which means that the main figures come out sometime in June. We know the GDP results for the first quarter and industrial output and similar indicators for the first five months of the year. Naturally, this puts pressure on us—and it would put pressure on anyone in our shoes—to operate with a certain surplus. It seems to me to be pointless that parliament is clamoring for this so soon. This is one of the causes of the problem. The other is that we have placed ourselves in the dilemma of whether to reduce taxes or to give additional resources to some of the sectors outside the economic sphere. You know very well that, in this year's budget, we have not increased the outlay of funds oriented toward the economy, but toward the extraeconomic sectors. I consider one of the prerequisites for success in 1996 to be whether we manage to ensure that the representatives of the professions in the nonproduction sphere are not responsible for setting off wages spirals and wages capillary elevation [mzdove vzlinani]. For me, this will be one of the question marks of this year. If these people forget that primary comparison has to be a comparison in time, and try constantly to make a comparison in space, then I am afraid that it would not necessarily turn out well. If a professor at a university, a doctor in a hospital, or a customs office commander only looks at how much the representatives of his profession in Switzerland and Denmark get, then we will be unable to count it up. I consider this to be the main problem and the budget dilemma this year was about this very issue. So, the discussion did not consist of the question of whether we want to have a large state budget or not.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] You mentioned a comparison in space. Did you mean only Europe or the fact that these people also make comparisons with the private sector where, after all, wages have a greater dynamism?

[Klaus] I meant, of course, a comparison in all of the possible spaces around us; that means both other professions in our country and the same professions in neighboring countries. Let me make another observation about wages. This is merely a liberal estimate—we can say that the average wage in 1996 will amount to roughly 10,000 korunas [Kc]. I believe that I am not far wrong. This is a truly enormous increase; it is three times as much compared with the situation six years ago and I must emphasize that prices have not gone up three times and that, in particular, a whole series of other positive effects of the market economy and free society has been acquired.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] So, you are saying that the standard of living is going up and that, besides real wages, people's opportunities are increasing and the quality of goods and services is improving. Real wages, however, are rising rapidly even without this, which has an impact through wage costs on the enterprises' ability to compete. Do you think that, in such a situation, Czech producers stand a chance of being successful on foreign markets?

[Klaus] It is necessary to compare all of the quantities with others. No figure in itself means that it is large or small. We had created a certain transformation cushion (which, admittedly, was not a product of deliberate government policy) when average productivity rose above wages and when companies, in the short to medium term, enjoyed above-average prosperity and an above-average level of profit. This cushion is becoming depleted, but—consequently—the enterprises' profit is also returning to a longer-term normal value. I am convinced that the cushion on the one hand plus considerable rationalization—especially of those branches of the economy that are oriented toward foreign trade—will contribute to our companies not being forced out of the market in terms of prices. It seems to me that there may still be further movement in real wages, faster than GDP. I do not want to predict how long; I think in the medium-term perspective.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Do you think that, from the point of view of the enterprises' ability to compete abroad, this criterion is the most important or are the enterprises not placed at a disadvantage by their inconvenient financing and with regard to their old debts? Is it not necessary to deal with this?

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[Klaus] It certainly is a problem, but it would be a big mistake to try and resolve it. The purpose and logic of our transformation did not lie in this. We inherited firms that, in some places, had a rusty gate in front of the factory and, in others, was freshly painted. This was and is reality. We would have to resolve these issues to the detriment of someone else and there is no one this could be.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The enterprises are also interested in the debate on currency policy. Experts are calling ever more volubly for an expansion of the fluctuation range. You said in August that you were looking into this idea. Is it already clear to you?

[Klaus] I would say that the options are still open and that no decision has been reached. If a decision had been reached, I would still not reveal it to you. I think, however, that this issue does not require an immediate solution. Rapid economic growth and economic turnover absorb a significant amount of the growing money supply and, therefore, I see no great danger from the point of view of inflation. I am more concerned that a fixed exchange rate makes it almost too comfortable for all concerned. We should shake both domestic and foreign entities out of this comfort, but more for this reason than for the excessive rise in the volume of money.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] You have talked about the influx of money and the increase in the capital account's assets. The other part of the balance of payments, the current account, is going into the red. Do you discern an amount in the share of the current account deficit in GDP that you would be concerned about and would it be necessary to do something?

[Klaus] I still think that a short-term deficit in the balance of payments current account is no major threat to the economy, especially if it is more than compensated for by the surplus in the capital account. All of this is closely associated with that hypothesis about transformation cushions. If the two cushions were already depleted—that is, both the wages and the exchange rate cushions—then a whole series of indicators would suggest that it is necessary to do something about the exchange rate. But, in my opinion, everything depends on the idea of whether we still have a certain amount of room in the cushion.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] You said a short-term deficit. About three years?

[Klaus] I suppose so.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] As far as its level is concerned, there is a big difference between a 2.0-percent deficit and a—for example—6.0-percent one.

[Klaus] I have just now received the foreign trade figures for November. It seems that the balance of trade deficit is again Kc10 billion. I am convinced, however, that in no way will it be Kc100 billion for 1995. On this scale, it should not be troublesome for two or three years.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] It is known that Deputy T. Jezek has submitted draft changes to the commercial code and to the law on securities, which should lead to greater protection for the small shareholder. Do you think that the current level of protection for shareholders is acceptable and, if you like, for the world in connection with the fact that we are applying for membership in the EU?

[Klaus] I do not want to give advice to the world. But, I think that our emerging capital market is a very delicate little flower and to try and enter into it by means of considerable legislative interventions may only do harm. In our country, the issue involves a clash between two concepts concerning protection for shareholders or control over the regulation of the capital market. This is a clash between two clearly articulate special interest groups in which each one puts forward his own specific, altogether tangible interests and objectives and describes the arguments of the other as theoretically flawed or legislatively bad. I think that too overstated protection for the so-called small shareholder that is false and misleading would not improve our capital market much. Perhaps the reverse. It would block the natural processes that are going on in it.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] Interlinking the banks with the investment funds is being discussed in a similar vein. Do you think this is a systemic error that will then be manifested both in the means of financing the enterprises and in the banks' credit policy?

[Klaus] I do not call this a systemic error; it is a reality that has been created in our country. There is a huge number of models for interlinking banks and capital markets throughout the world and I do not have the feeling that ours is so absolutely nonstandard. Of course, if someone were to ask me if I would rather have the U.S. model than the continental, German, one, then I would want the U.S. model. But, again, like everything else, this is an evolutionary process where we are not facing any catastrophes.

[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY] The deputies rejected the university law in its first reading in parliament. In your opinion, is there a chance that tuition fees will be passed in parliament, and what do you think about their rejection?

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[Klaus] Tuition fees are a topic that was played out long ago and has been accepted by everyone. It is a gross political mistake that some parties, in an attempt to curry favor with the voters, have propelled themselves into the foolhardy step of rejecting tuition fees and the entire draft university law. I am finding out at my regular meetings with students that they have come to terms with this. Their elders and those who hide behind them politically do not want to come to terms with this. I explained this recently at the high school in Dvur Kralove. When I asked which of the fourth-year students had a bicycle or skis, virtually all of them raised their hands—so, I told them that tuition fees are a consideration about whether they can get by without one of these things. Putting it in a language that they understand turned out to be absolutely crucial. But, some of the gentlemen rectors—and, unfortunately, coalition parties—do not want to do this on purpose. I am sorry about that.

Statistics on Romany Population in Country

96CH0010D Prague TYDEN in Czech 20 Nov 95 p 24

[Report based on an article by Ivan Vesely, secretary of the Romany Democratic Congress: "Romanies in the Czech Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Number

In the 1991 population census, 32,903 individuals claimed Romany nationality. According to statistics maintained by labor offices and by social departments, some 200,000 Romanies live in our country; they themselves estimate their number to amount to 300,000. After World War II, only about 600 Czech Romanies returned from the concentration camps; the current Romany population is made up mostly of immigrants from Slovakia and their progeny. Most of the Romanies live in the north of Bohemia and in larger industrial cities; there are very few in rural areas.

Family

A Romany family has an average of four or five children, and more of their children suffer from birth defects than the rest of the population. The average age of Romanies is up to 15 years lower than that for the remainder of the population.

Earning Possibilities

Approximately 70 percent of the Romanies are unemployed; among those that are employed, 90 percent are laborers. Working men earn a monthly average of approximately 6,000 korunas [Kc], women earn about Kc2,500 net. The main income for the majority of Romany families consists of allowances for children and unemployment benefits.

Education

Approximately one-half of Romany children attend special schools, generally primarily because of social inadequacies (poor knowledge of the Czech language). Middle schools are attended by fewer than 1 percent of Romany children. Two Romanies are studying at Charles University.

Relationship With the Majority of Society

They criticize the majority for being egotistical, for being servile, for being selfish, and this gives rise to their frequent lack of desire to integrate.

Whom They Appreciate

The family that proves able to care for its members, musicians, businessmen, soldiers who fought in the war. Among women, the most appreciated are the seeresses.

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Defense Minister Interviewed on NATO, Army

AU0401145296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Dec 95 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Defense Minister Jan Sitek by Pavol Vitko; place and date not given: "We Must Stop the Drain of Army Experts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vitko] Minister, the chairman of the Slovak National Party, of which you are a member, has repeatedly questioned Slovakia's endeavors to join NATO as soon as possible. At the same time, the government presents these efforts as one of its priority foreign political interests. So how will you manage to reconcile endeavors for our integration into the transatlantic security structures with doubts of your party's leader?

[Sitek] I do not believe myself in a position where I would have to deal with two different political pressures. The formation of the government coalition was preceded by compromises by the coalition parties. A different opinion may exist within the framework of the political party that nominated the minister for the government. I do not see it as anything unusual. Nevertheless, the adopted government policy binds every member of the government. In this respect, I would like to note that, as we joined the government, we expected more details regarding the specific conditions for joining NATO this coming year and, among other things, to be able to immediately start working on satisfying them. It somehow keeps being postponed. Although they defined some requirements this year—the compatibility of communication systems, for instance—I believe that the definitive requirements will not be known even in the coming year. On the part of NATO, the entire issue is left in a certain, not altogether specific stage of assessment, apparently also because of the relations between NATO and Russia. I believe that this situation is here to stay for a while, as the presidential elections in both Russia and the United States are fast approaching.

[Vitko] The Defense Ministry received 12.9 billion korunas [Sk] from the state budget this year. The troops had just enough money for food and basic training, but they certainly could not even think about modernization of the equipment or purchase of new arm systems. Do you consider this ongoing situation sustainable with respect to the defense capability of Slovakia, for it has not changed since the creation of the Slovak Army?

[Sitek] It is true that this problem emerged immediately after the formation of the Defense Ministry of independent Slovakia. The needs of our ministry were not planned in the sufficient scope at the time. This year's budget, as well as the Sk13.588 billion the parliament approved for us for 1996, represents a moderate increase compared to 1993. Our experts submitted a budget proposal Sk7.1 billion higher. We can do nothing, however, but base our spending on the economic possibilities of our state. So far, we can obtain new arms only within the framework of redemption of the Russian debt. This way, we received six Russian MiG-29's in December, and two more are still to come. This means that we will not have to spend substantial funds on maintaining the MiG-21 at the end of its service life. Perhaps, we will also receive from Russia the S-300 antiaircraft system. If that is the case, we may be able to discard some missiles that also require very high maintenance, and we would again be able to save something. Nevertheless, this budget really does not meet our overall needs concerning the foundation of a housing construction fund or technical equipment repairs.

[Vitko] Despite the problems, the Army of the Slovak Republic holds within it so much moral strength that it is the most trusted institution in the eyes of the Slovak public. On the other hand, another 600 professionals left the Army this year. Our career soldiers are paid the worst of all the armies around with the sole exception of the Ukrainian Army. Are you not concerned that morale among Army professionals may suffer because of meager remuneration?

[Sitek] This problem should be dealt with very quickly. Private enterprises are emerging throughout the Republic that need managers for their executive posts. Basically every commanding officer is more or less a trained manager. Despite initial doubts, firms have verified this dictum. They offer better financial conditions, and the Army is losing quality people. We are trying to deter this trend. In the General Treasury Report chapter of the 1996 Budget Law, Sk200 million was earmarked for housing military professionals. We are preparing a bill on social insurance for career soldiers. It should give them an advantage over other government employees similar to the armies of economically advanced states. The State Defense Council discussed the wages of career soldiers which are truly low. It adopted a resolution, according to which a special law is to be drafted on remunerating soldiers in active service. Upon approval, it should go into effect on 1 January 1997.

[Vitko] Revenues from the operation of the Defense Ministry and the Army of the Slovak Republic should have amounted to Sk76 million. How did you do with respect to this plan?

[Sitek] I believe that we have done well in this respect. As of 31 November [date as published], we have acquired Sk109.5 million from the sale of surplus equipment and other activities. We asked the Finance

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Ministry for permission to use the increase for Army needs. This way, we gained Sk27 million, which we used for the purchase of apartments and transferred to the housing construction funds.

[Vitko] Beginning in December, the organization of civilian service [for those objecting to military service] was transferred from the administration of the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family to the auspices of the Defense Ministry. What kind of additional expenditures does this mean for your ministry?

[Sitek] We have budgeted Sk82 million for the civilian service. The budget of the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family was probably reduced by this amount. We have transferred computers and databases from labor offices to district military administrations and earmarked another Sk2.5 million for the purchase of computer equipment.

[Vitko] The National Council of the Slovak Republic approved yesterday the transfer of our units operating in the former Yugoslavia to eastern Slavonia, where they are to operate in the UN units. Will the system of their financing change? Is there a change expected in the remuneration of our engineer troops?

[Sitek] The system of financing our unit is not changing. Beginning 1 July 1996, however, the United Nations should pay us amounts that have been agreed upon on a regular monthly basis. The equipment was assessed prior to the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] operation in White Paper I, II, and III at $35 million. According to a leasing calendar, we should receive 30 percent of its price for two years of use and 20 percent for another two years. So far, we have received a single payment in 1994—$4.9 million. In an ideal case, we should receive $6.1 million from the United Nations on 1 July 1996, and $370,000 every month thereafter. We do not intend to change the compensation of our troops in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, we thank them for their efforts and excellent representation of the Army of the Slovak Republic. And similarly to all honest career soldiers, conscripts, and civilian employees of our Army, and, at the same time I wish joyous holidays and all the best for the new year.

On Modernization, Budget

AU0401165796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Dec 95 p 3

[Interview with Defense Minister Jan Sitek by Martin Hric; place and date not given: "Talking With National Defense Minister Jan Sitek About Aircraft, Tanks, Hazing, and Other Issues"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Hric] The Czech Republic is ardently discussing whether to modernize the electronics in the MiG-21 or to reequip the Air Force with Phantoms. Of course, we cannot afford the Phantoms, and they are far from being a condition for our integration into NATO. What is the ministerial concept regarding the Air Force?

[Sitek] I called a meeting of experts, interested Air Force officials, the General Staff, and logistics officers on this topic. The conclusion is that, because of the division of the federal equipment—when we obtained not a third but half of the Mig-29's—and since we have obtained six MiG-2's and will obtain another fighter and a training MiG-29 as repayment of the outstanding Russian debt, we will not modernize the MiG-21's, but just let them finish their service life. There has been some talk about selling them following an overhaul.

[Hric] A similarly interesting issue is the electronic modernization of the T-72 tanks. What is the situation regarding this issue?

[Sitek] It is not just a matter of electronics but rather an overall modernization. Our army, as well as customers abroad, are interested only in the best quality product. The T-72 is competitive in most aspects with any tanks from Spain, Slovenia, or Israel. Moreover, it is significantly cheaper. Our arms manufacturers in Martin and Dubnica are working on an agreement to add the finishing touches to some aggregates so as to satisfy the demands of both our army and foreign customers.

[Hric] Our arms exports are certainly not the problem of the ministry, but you have two representatives in the arms exports license commission. The Zuzana howitzer would be an export gem. A condition is, however, at least a token model in our army. Our army cannot afford it, and the manufacturer cannot afford to provide it on credit. Where do you see a way out?

[Sitek] Many of our foreign partners have expressed their interest in Zuzana. The condition is at least a token model in our army. I expect that the recently founded arms manufacturers' holding will play a role here. In addition to the research, development, manufacture, and financing of arms systems, it is jointly responsible for their sale. I expect that it will find a possibility of leasing or some other way of opening export channels by shipment of a reference model to our army.

The problem is that very few people are capable of perceiving one aspect of this issue. All funds spent on the Army remain in Slovakia. Moreover, according to my experts, 80 percent of the money goes back to the

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treasury in the form of payment of direct or indirect taxes. [passage omitted]

[Hric] One more final question: Regarding next year's state budget, we have encountered objections that while the Government Office, the Slovak Information Service, and also the Army fared well, the health care or education did not.

[Sitek] I certainly am not qualified to judge the Government Office or Slovak Information Service budget chapters. Regarding yours—or other—optimistic ideas, however, about the Army budget, I do not share your optimism. The increase does not even cover the inflation rate. I am only happy that, after a hard struggle, we managed to get 200 million korunas earmarked for dealing with the housing issue. [passage omitted]

'Official' Russian Intelligence Representative

AU0501125396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by "pt": "Members of the Slovak Information Service Will Go to Moscow in January"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—We have managed to learn from a well-informed source close to the Slovak Interior Ministry that the government's jet is to depart for Moscow on 9 January with a large number of Slovak Information Service [SIS] members on board. So far, we have not ascertained the exact number of SIS intelligence officers who are to leave for Moscow. According to this source, the trip is closely connected with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's last official visit to Moscow on 30-31 October 1995, when two SIS officers were members of his delegation. Official representatives of Western intelligence services represented in Slovakia assess the SIS members' planned January trip to Moscow as a successful operation of their colleague Valeriy Zarubin, employee of the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Slovak Republic, who is the official representative of the Russian intelligence service in Bratislava. Yesterday we tried to contact him by telephone but an embassy employee told us that he would not be in all day and that we could call him today.

SIS Reportedly Used Against Meciar Rivals

AU0401135096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jan 96 p 4

[Commentary by Peter Toth: "Question Marks Over Finances for the Slovak Information Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New Year's Day is behind us, and Slovak Information Service [SIS] Director Ivan Lexa can enjoy the 759,588,000 korunas that had been allocated to his organization by the state budget for 1996. Should [Christian Democratic Movement] Deputy Pittner's words be confirmed that networks of former StB [communist-era secret service] agents are to be revived within the framework of the secret service, that a section for special (commando) operations is to be established, and that the SIS is to purchase helicopters in violation of the law, little will be left of the extra quarter of a billion that the SIS received for this year.

A huge question mark is hovering over the use of money allocated to the SIS. Ever since Ivan Lexa became chief of the secret service and Jaroslav S. director of counterintelligence, the legitimacy of this secret service's activities has been in serious doubt. Leaving aside the scandal over the kidnapping of the president's son, information is mounting that the SIS shadows and collects information about persons politically inconvenient to present government power. From this viewpoint it is only natural that the secret service chiefs need to expand the network of agents (even by reviving the StB's old network) because "inconvenient" persons are to be found not only among politicians, but also among businessmen, financiers, church representatives, representatives of civic associations, and journalists. Worthy of attention in this context is the use of the SIS surveillance section against former Finance Minister Julius Toth, whom Vladimir Meciar regards as his rival. Moreover, Julius Toth is so independent financially that he need not rely on unconditional support of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia chairman and prime minister. This further increases Meciar's distrust of him.

As clearly transpires from the Law on the SIS, this organization is to protect the interests of the state and collect information on persons and groups that might damage those interests or commit serious criminal activity, chiefly its organized forms (smuggling and trade in weapons, drugs, or uranium). It is for such activity that it receives taxpayers' money—Sk759.588 million in 1996.

The operation of the SIS under Ivan Lexa's management does not indicate that the transit of drugs, uranium, or weapons across the territory of the Slovak Republic should radically decline in 1996. Rather, it indicates that "work" on inconvenient persons will become more intensive.

Lexa Linked to StB

AU0501123196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jan 96 p 4

[Commentary by Peter Toth: "...Now I Belong to the SIS!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Lexa was born on 18 August 1961 in Bratislava, states the official biography of

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present director of the Slovak Information Service [SIS], issued by TASR on the occasion of his appointment. It is remarkable that a man of the same name and with the same date of birth is featured in the registry of files of the now-defunct communist StB [State Security Corps]. Name: Ivan Lexa. Date of birth: 18-08-61. Registration number: 33678. Code name: Alex. Category: D (confidant [dovernik]—editor's note). So much for the official biography and the StB register of files. I do not want to claim categorically that the director of the secret service and the man of the same name and with the same date of birth are one and the same person. However, at the same time I have to say that it would have to be a remarkable coincidence for two children to be born on the same day in 1961, to be given the name Ivan, and to inherit from their father the relatively uncommon surname Lexa.

It is equally obvious that, after Ivan Lexa became SIS chief, former StB officers have found the doors open at the SIS. This is true, for example, of Colonel Jaroslav S., director of counterintelligence, or Gejza V., chief of the surveillance section. Former StB officer Tkac has also found employment with the SIS. It was precisely Col. Jaroslav S. who employed him in the SIS counterintelligence as an expert in the struggle against churches.

If the present SIS chief did work for the StB in the category "confidant," he must have taken part in the work of counterintelligence in uncovering so-called antistate activities and organizing counterintelligence, preventive-educational, and technical measures. His current subordinates, who worked in the StB as intelligence officers, must have taken part in far more serious operations of the communist counterintelligence. Such a situation in the SIS is not only a domestic political, but also an international political catastrophe for the young Slovak Republic. It means for this state that people who made the flesh creep of several generations of people living in the CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic] are taking an important area of this state's operations into their hands. Major Haluska, a character from the novel Black Barons [satire set in a forced labor camp in the 1950's], used to say: "Let bygones be bygones, now I am major."

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Mecs: Security Concerns Over Bosnia Exaggerated

AU0401172896 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 3 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by "V.F.": "Imre Mecs Trusts NATO's Defense—Hungarian Soldiers Will Only Travel If They Are Secured"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Imre Mecs, chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, Hungary will not send its soldiers to carry out technical tasks in Bosnia within the framework of the IFOR [Implementation Force] peacemaking forces until their due and reasonable security is ensured. Mecs confirmed to MAGYAR NEMZET that there is a complete agreement on this issue between the Defense Ministry's and the Defense Committee.

Mecs rejected the view that the Budapest parliament should again deal with the mandate of the technical units participating in the peacemaking mission. It is known, on the basis of the opinion of two NATO generals who recently held talks in Hungary, that the protection of the Hungarian soldiers in Bosnia is not clear after all. The high-ranking officers objected to the lack of armored vehicles in the equipment of the troops training for the mission, and urged the use of other weapons in addition to small arms for self-defense. As was revealed by press reports, according to the two generals, the Hungarians themselves, rather than NATO, will be responsible for their own security, although the Budapest parliament, in view of the results of former official talks, only approved the sending of a noncombatant technical unit equipped with light weapons for self-defense.

With an acceptable level of risk, the security of the Hungarian unit can still be ensured, Mecs believes. One precondition of this is that, rather than going to war, they will be keeping peace in an area where the warring sides are already tired and all agree on accepting the presence of international peacekeeping troops. However, Mecs believes that it is not possible to strive for absolute security; he says that someone can be run over by a car even in the streets of Budapest or, in theory, anyone can be shot dead by Irish terrorists in front of London's Parliament. Mecs also warns that it would be unfortunate to give in to the hysteria surrounding the sending of our troops because the actual risks of the mission should not be exaggerated.

Mecs pointed out that the generals who had recently held talks in Hungary and raised this problem were of relatively low rank and, owing to their position, they made practical remarks in connection with the preparation of our troops, which were then simply "inflated" in Hungary. To our question, Mecs confirmed that these polemics did not cause any problems in relations between NATO and Hungary. He said that this was why civilian control operates in the army and, rather than generals controlling politics, it is the other way around. Mecs is also certain that the Hungarian side would not send troops until due and reasonable security was guaranteed, but he added that he himself did not see any realistic danger of having to decide for some reason not to send the Hungarian unit to Bosnia.

Military Chief, Serbs Discussing Unit's Security

LD0401193096 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian technical unit [of the Implementation Force] will be stationed in an exclusively Serb area and therefore Hungary is initiating negotiations with the Serb military chief of staff about the security of the Hungarian unit. This was stated, among other things, at the staff meeting in Ercsi, which was also attended by Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti. It should be said that the soldiers preparing to leave for Bosnia had focused their questions to the minister on issues other than this one. Szilard Nemeth reports:

[Nemeth] Money was the issue which, at the staff meeting that Defense Minister Keleti attended, preoccupied the Hungarian soldiers leaving for Bosnia. Were they to pay with forints or dollars in the Bosnian canteens? They wanted to know how they would be able to open a forint account for family members left behind in Hungary. What about the supplement for performing dangerous duties, they asked.

The defense minister said that it is not a bad thing at all that the soldiers are preoccupied with these issues because it shows that the soldiers feel they will be secure in Bosnia.

In view of the fact that the Hungarian technical unit will be stationed north of Banja Luka, in an exclusively Serb area, the Hungarian chief of staff is holding negotiations with leaders of the Bosnian Serb army, too, about preparations for the arrival of the Hungarian forces.

Colonel General Ferenc Deak, commander of the Hungarian army, added that the level of training and technical equipment of the Hungarian forces is the best possible. He called on the soldiers to form correct and good relations with the residents there and to fulfill the tasks allocated to them without reservations.

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Party Urges More Say on Peacekeeping Units

LD0501113896 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The opposition party FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] proposes to parliament that the government should be able to take decisions in more issues than at present, without the National Assembly's approval, in connection with the Hungarian peacekeepers who will go to Bosnia.

Their proposal is aimed at ensuring that the Hungarian peacekeeping units setting off for Bosnia are adequately armed, and, if necessary, that there are more of them, party chairman Viktor Orban said.

Orban does not agree with the idea of armed soldiers from another country protecting the Hungarian soldiers in Bosnia, in accordance with the National Assembly resolution currently in force.

Alternative Candidate to Horn Proposed in MSZP

AU0401184996 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Jan 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Vitanyi: A Counter Nominee for Chairman Is Needed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Ivan Vitanyi, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party's [MSZP] National Committee, Party Chairman Gyula Horn might have a counter candidate at the MSZP's March congress, where officials are to be reelected. On Nap TV's [Sun Television—Channel 1's morning program] 2 January program, he said: If we interpret democracy correctly, then we need to have a counter candidate because the performance of every person has to be assessed.

In an interview with MTI, Vitanyi said that, among others, Mrs. Magda Kovacs Kosa, Bela Katona, and Tamas Krausz would also be involved in preparing the committee's report for the congress. In the report, they want to assess the activities of the Socialist members of the government.

In the television program, Vitanyi admitted that, after the restrictive measures introduced in March 1995, decisions were also made that had not been properly prepared. He added that Finance Minister Lajos Bokros had played a positive role in the government by starting to implement the reforms decisively, but in many cases he had not handled the serious decisions with the seriousness befitting the situation and expected of a finance minister.

MNB Chairman Views Macroeconomic Processes

AU0401181196 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Dec 95 pp 1, 10

[Interview with MNB Chairman Gyorgy Suranyi by Katalin Bossanyi; place and date not given: "We Must Come to an Agreement With Ourselves—Interview on Prices, Wages, Interests With MNB Chairman Suranyi"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The citizens have received presents for the new year: a new foreign exchange code, the convertibility of the forint, and the abolition of the foreign currency limit. Rumor has it, however, that, referring to the free convertibility, the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] will compel the Hungarian depositors to exchange their foreign currency deposits to forints at the prevailing rate. Is this fear justified, we asked MNB Chairman Gyorgy Suranyi.

[Suranyi] This fear is completely unfounded: We have no intention whatsoever to touch the foreign currency savings of either the population or the entrepreneurs. Naturally, we wish to continue a monetary policy that further strengthens confidence in the forint.

[Bossanyi] A more favorable interest rate is already being paid on forint deposits....

[Suranyi] The population and the market can also sense this. In fact, contrary to the 1993-94 tendencies, the experience is that the produced income does not leave the country through legal or semilegal channels but, instead, the foreign currency tends to remain in Hungarian banks. Or the depositors sell it because they speculate on the forint in the positive sense. In time, the fetish-like characteristic of foreign currency will disappear, precisely due to the convertibility.

[Bossanyi] At the moment, the Hungarian foreign currency reserves are a rather impressive $9 billion; of course, some of this is the population's money. From time to time, we hear that the state would touch this money if our financial problems again became severe.

[Suranyi] This is also a completely unfounded rumor. No legal possibility exists either for the state or the MNB to touch those savings. Actually, no government has ever considered such a measure even in the most difficult financial situation, so why should it do so now that a marked improvement can be seen?!

[Bossanyi] Can convertibility revalue the national currency in a moral, rather than monetary, sense for the population and the investors?

[Suranyi] We have not sufficiently emphasized the value of this change so far! The 1989 and 1990 Central European changes also expressed the people's desire

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to live in a world where ideas, goods, and services can move freely. The convertibility of the national currency is a precondition for this kind of civic world. Therefore, the declaration of the forint's convertibility is of symbolic importance from the social and political as well as economic and financial points of view.

[Bossanyi] Does the current step mean a complete convertibility?

[Suranyi] It meets the IMF's convertibility criteria and the OECD's tougher conditions. Convertibility is full in the current account, from the viewpoint of the population, households, and the business sector. Some not too significant limitations will remain in the capital balance, but this will also have a large degree of liberalization from January. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] A noticeable change took place in the financial processes by the end of the year. As for the area of monetary policy, stabilization brought a fast and spectacular improvement. At the same time, you emphasized on a number of occasions that this is still a very fragile balance. Why?

[Suranyi] We must adhere very consistently to stabilization, no matter how unpopular these measures are, to make the improvement lasting. This is the only way to push inflation below 10 percent and to lay the foundations for a lasting, at least 5 percent annual economic growth, which is the program for catching up. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] The improvement of the balance did not break the economic growth, and this seems to justify the concept of "sustainable growth" you talk about. Will it break it in the future, or does the production sphere have enough strength to serve as a basis?

[Suranyi] The twin deficits—that of the current account and that of the state administration—can only be reduced jointly. An element of stabilization has not been emphasized much so far: The deficit of the central budget also had to be reduced very drastically to release more resources for the business sphere through the restrictive measures. Rather than allowing a recession to emerge, the competitive companies should be able to continue to develop themselves, and faster than before. It seems that we have managed to carry out this very difficult maneuver and, while taking the sharp economic turn, to use a sailing term, the boat did not heel over, but started to head for the goal: GDP can grow by 2 percent this year. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] In 1995, no agreement has been achieved on the 5-percent real wage decrease recommended by the government, and, finally, wages decreased by 10 to 11 percent. Is it possible that you pressed the inflation button a little harder?

[Suranyi] The government and the central bank did not deny that, in the first phase of stabilization, they would wish to continue an economic policy that restricts consumption and encourages savings. To achieve this, it was necessary to reduce the real wages this year. It is not at all true that inflation has got out of hand. Economic mechanisms continue to function even when no agreements are made. The difference—which is not little—is that when there is an agreement, one can act sooner and the burdens can be reduced.

[Bossanyi] How much longer do we have to put up with this tightening of the belt?

[Suranyi] If the acceleration of the "price-wage" spiral can be avoided and the saving inclinations and the performance of the exporters can be increased, then, according to the calculations, we will not need a reduction of real wages in 1997. This is especially true if the proportion of social insurance expenditure compared to the GDP can be reduced. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] Let us talk about another important tool of monetary policy. Interest rates are high, and this also increases inflation and reduces the entrepreneurs' room for maneuver. What is the current situation, and what can be expected next year?

[Suranyi] First of all, let us clarify: Compared to what is the interest rate high? It is an important fact that, already last summer, the MNB was unable to sell one-year state bonds with an interest rate lower than 30-31 percent. The market players, precisely because they sensed the serious upset of the macroeconomic balance accurately, were correct in forecasting that we would have 30-percent inflation in the summer of 1995. The central bank could do nothing worse than start to force down the interest rate artificially. If a positive real interest rate does not exist, then people would rather spend the money that they originally wanted to save, and this fuels inflation further. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] The MNB is left with the task of managing the foreign debt. Is it possible to "outgrow" the debt?

[Suranyi] The interest payment obligation is $1.5 to $1.7 billion a year. The incoming capital—without the privatization income—more or less equaled this in 1995. As we can realistically expect growing exports in the coming years, we can gradually outgrow the debt. This can happen even with an annual 3-percent growth. The goal is an annual 5- to 6-percent growth, which is the necessary minimum to prevent the gap between us and the EU countries increasing.

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Realistic Conditions

[[Bossanyi] Recently, a statement of intent was made between the government and the IMF's delegation on an 18-month bridging loan. You said that we probably would not make use of the loan because this agreement was not needed to finance the country. What does this mean?

[Suranyi] I have always said that we must come to an agreement with ourselves on what road we wish to take. We must create economic and social conditions for ourselves that make it possible to complete the stabilization, fundamentally change the state administration, and achieve lasting and fast economic growth as a result. If politics, the economy, and society came to an agreement on this, then the IMF agreement would indeed only have a symbolic importance. The macroeconomic framework that is now being outlined—providing that the budget of the social insurance also adjusts to this—will create realistic conditions for this kind of external and internal agreement.

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OSCE Disarmament Talks Stall, Resume in Vienna

Serbs Trying To 'Renegotiate'

AU0401182596 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1700 GMT 4 Jan 96

[Report by Hubert Arnim Ellison on the OSCE conference in Vienna on 4 January, including recorded statements by Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Bosnian Serbs, and Mr. Dervisbegovic, head of the Muslim-Croat delegation — Dervisbegovic speaks in English with superimposed German translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ellison] The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] conference in the Vienna Hofburg Palace is in full swing. The Bosnian Serb delegation is obviously trying once again to call the negotiating results of Dayton into question, as Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha makes clear. He speaks of a betrayal of the Bosnian Serbs.

[Buha] I have two versions of this Dayton paper. One version is of 19 November, and it says 1:1. The final version — I do not know how it came about — says 2:1. Perhaps these papers were smuggled in, if I may say so, at the last moment, and that is why we have this situation. However, I believe that we will be able to clarify all this in the course of these negotiations. At first, we must find out how this came about. If it is a lie, I think it can still be corrected.

[Ellison] This is what Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha from the delegation of the Bosnian Serbs says.

Neither the OSCE conference chairman nor the Muslim-Croat delegation are willing to renegotiate Dayton, however. Mr. Dervisbegovic, the head of the Muslim-Croat delegation, told ORF today:

[Dervisbegovic] What we really need is peace and the implementation of the Dayton agreement, without any discussion about the points that have been agreed in Dayton. What has been signed must now be implemented.

Sarajevo Opposes Serb Participation

AU0401182396 Paris AFP in English 1744 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, Jan 4 (AFP) — A crucial conference on disarming the belligerents in former Yugoslavia began here Thursday, but quickly ran into trouble after Bosnian Government officials refused to negotiate with a Serb delegation, diplomats said.

The talks got off to a promising start Thursday morning, with all participants guardedly optimistic, but foundered when the Bosnian Government delegation objected to Serb participation in the afternoon discussions.

This session was to have built on the opening talks on confidence-building measures in Bosnia to include broader discussions on reducing arms levels across former Yugoslavia.

But the Bosnian side, led by senior Foreign Ministry official Hasan Dervisbegovic, objected to Serb participation in the disarmament discussion, saying Sarajevo alone could negotiate with Zagreb and Belgrade on decommissioning weapons across the former Yugoslavia.

The talks had still not begun by 5:30 p.m. (1630 GMT), with conference co-president Norwegian General Vigleik Eide seeking a compromise between the two sides.

The twin-track negotiations, being held under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are considered vital to the success of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) as it strives to police a fragile peace across Bosnia.

Under the Dayton peace accord, the OSCE must secure agreement not only on weapons ratios and confidence-building in Bosnia, but on an international arms reduction treaty between Bosnia, Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by June 6.

Earlier Thursday, the signs were positive following discussions on building confidence in Bosnia which, under the peace agreement reached in November in Dayton, Ohio, must produce an agreement within three weeks.

Speaking to journalists outside the closed-door session, Bosnian Serb and government officials expressed cautious optimism that the talks on scaling down weapon levels in Bosnia-Herzegovina would produce results ahead of the January 26 deadline.

But Bosnian Serb "foreign minister" Aleksa Buha stressed that the Serbs still had reservations over the scale of disarmament proposed under the Bosnian peace accords signed last month.

In particular, Buha repeated Serb objections to the clause of the peace agreement stipulating that the Serbs should end up with a military arsenal half as powerful as that of the Moslem-Croat Federation.

But he stressed he was "fairly optimistic" that the talks could secure agreement from the various sides on confidence-building measures within three weeks.

His optimism was echoed by the conference's other co-president, Istvan Gyarmati, who said the disarmament conference had "got off to a good start."

Gyarmati sought to play down Buha's reservations, which he said did not pose a major obstacle to the talks.

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The closed-door negotiations opened Thursday morning at Vienna's former imperial Hofburg Palace as part of measures designed to scale down the arsenals of the warring factions in a region bristling with military hardware after more than four years of war across former Yugoslavia.

The talks were given a boost later Thursday as the Bosnian Serbs released 16 Bosnians abducted in a Serb-held suburb, ending a week- long crisis that had threatened to undermine the war-wracked republic's first tentative steps toward peace.

Buha is leading a four-member team at the talks, while Dervisbegovic is representing both the Sarajevo government and the Moslem-Croat federation.

Also present were representatives of the OSCE — the 53-member pan-European group plus the United States and Canada, the "Contact Group" on Bosnia — Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — and the presidency of the European Union, currently held by Italy.

These negotiations were officially launched on December 18 in Bonn by 16 foreign ministers from the warring sides and the international community.

Talks Resume After Compromise

AU0501124096 Paris AFP in English 1208 GMT 5 Jan 96

[By Odile Meuvret]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, Jan 5 (AFP) — Negotiations on disarming the belligerents in the former Yugoslavia resumed early Friday after a half-day delay sparked by Bosnia's attempts to expel the Bosnian Serbs from the negotiating table.

Originally scheduled to open Thursday afternoon, the negotiations finally got underway at 0900 (0800 GMT) at Vienna's former imperial Hofburg Palace.

The twin-track negotiations on disarmament and confidence-building measures in the Balkans are being held under the auspices of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

They are seen as crucial to the success of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) as it strives to police a fragile peace across Bosnia.

Conference co-president Norwegian General Vigleik Eide presided over six hours of haggling among the various parties, which dragged on into Thursday night, after the Bosnian government delegation objected to Bosnian Serb participation in the disarmament discussions.

They finally reached a compromise allowing all five sides to sit at the same table Friday morning by putting up a poster at the entry to the negotiating room which read: "Negotiations among the parties to the Dayton Agreement".

This satisfied the Bosnian wish to deny international recognition for the Bosnian Serbs. But each delegation's place at the table was marked by a notice reading "representative of".

The objection raised by the Bosnian government delegation — headed by senior foreign ministry official Hasan Dervibegovic — was backed by the Croatian side.

The Bosnian Serb delegation, led by "foreign minister" Aleksa Buha, insisted that its presence was guaranteed under the US-brokered Bosnia peace accords, which he said specified that all five parties should take part in the disarmament talks.

They are the rump Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Bosnian Serb republic and the Moslem-Croat federation.

Under the peace accords reached in the United States in November, the OSCE must secure agreement from the various sides on confidence-building measures by January 26, and on an international arms reduction treaty between Bosnia and its neighbours Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia by June 6.

The first set of negotiations on confidence-building measures took place as planned on Thursday morning.

These involve two delegations, one headed by Buha and the other by Dervibegovic, who represents both the Bosnian government and the Moslem-Croat federation.

They were due to resume around midday Friday with the adoption of a protocol on the exchange of liaison officers between the Bosnian Serb republic and the Moslem-Croat federation.

The other co-president, Hungarian diplomat Istvan Gyarmati, told reporters Friday morning that this second plenary session would cover the first exchange of information between the former warring sides on heavy arms stockpiles.

These talks must be wrapped up at the latest by June 6, to be followed by an arms reduction treaty for all sides.

Also attending the talks were representatives of the OSCE — the 53-member pan-European group plus the United States and Canada, the "Contact Group" on Bosnia — Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States — and the presidency of the European Union, currently held by Italy.

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Croatia's Tudjman, Izetbegovic on Council Meeting

LD0401171596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent Andjelko Perincic in Sarajevo] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia and of the Council for Cooperation, said:

[Begin Tudjman recording] On behalf of the Croatian state delegation I would like to express my satisfaction above all at the fact that the first meeting of the Cooperation Council between Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Croatia has been held, and also my satisfaction at the way in which we discussed frankly all the issues which are currently relevant for the breathing of life into the Washington agreements and the Dayton agreement.

Naturally, there are many problems along this road, but one should state, as we did today at the meeting, that significant progress has nevertheless been achieved since the war situation which we had before. No longer is there any confrontation. There are problems which need to be resolved. Otherwise, the changes which have come about both as part of the war operations, and as a result of the agreements, require fresh solutions, as President Izetbegovic has said, in terms of the organization of the cantons, as well.

In my opinion it is vital that, in the work of this Council for Cooperation, and as a whole, in the breathing of life into these agreements, we should systematically build up trust between the Bosniak-Muslim and Croat people in the Federation, and also between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation and Croatia. The aim is to remove all obstacles which obstruct the path to life together and cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, because this is in the interests of both the Croatian people and, I am convinced, in the interests of the Bosniak Muslim side, and in the interests not only of ourselves, but also the main international players, Europe and the world. [end recording]

[Perincic] The vice president of the council, Alija Izetbegovic, who is also president of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, explained to journalists some of the points discussed:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] First we resolved the issue of the agenda of the meeting; we agreed on the agenda. Then we considered the implementation of the agreement on the realization of the federation as per the Washington and Dayton agreements. Croatia, as you know, is a witness and party to the Washington and Dayton Agreements. As part of this question we also discussed the borders of the cantons, because, as you know, a change has come about in the territory of the federation as compared to the situation at the time of the Washington Agreements. Our side raised the issue of the freedom of movement and the guarantee of property rights. We also discussed the establishment of a government here and the problem of the return of refugees. [end recording]

[Perincic] We came to the conclusion, Izetbegovic said, that the implementation of the Federation is stagnating, and that it needs to be accelerated, and that in relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina there are a series of agreements which still await signing. All in all, the meeting was polemical, but constructive.

Tudjman: Talks Open 'New Page'

AU0401194996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jan 96

[Report by Stevo Latinovic on a news conference held by President Alija Izetbegovic of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Sarajevo on 4 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Latinovic] [Words indistinct] the two delegations agreed on an agenda, and discussed the agreement on the implementation of the Federation [words indistinct] the Washington and Dayton agreements. President Izetbegovic had this to say:

[Izetbegovic] As part of this question we also discussed the borders of the cantons, because, as you know, a change has come about in the territory of the Federation as compared to the situation at the time of the Washington agreement. Our side raised the issue of the freedom of movement and the guarantee of property rights. We also discussed the establishment of a government here, and the problem of the return of refugees.

[Latinovic] These problems were discussed, but what was done?

[Izetbegovic] We unfortunately came to the conclusion that similar progress has not been made in a number of things. The implementation of the Federation is stagnating. We agreed that these problems do exist and that the implementation has to be accelerated. We also discussed a series of questions concerning the relations between the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. There is a series of agreements already drafted and presented to the Croatian Government, which still await signing. We insisted that these agreements be signed. [Word indistinct] to this aim that contacts should be intensified between the two governments so that the issues of these agreements can finally be solved, within which — in our view — the agreement on the use of the port of Ploce

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has priority. In connection with this issue, we agreed on the urgent formation of an ad hoc committee of experts, led by the deputy prime ministers, that would regulate a number of questions that have not been solved within the problem regarding the use of the port of Ploce and passage through Neum.

As for visas, a small step forward has been made, as visas will be abolished for the citizens of the Federation, but visas will remain in force for the time being for the citizens of the so-called Serb entity. The government will this regime by elections, and by 1 September 1996 at the latest. [sentence as heard]

When it comes to property protection, the mutual protection of Croatian property in Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice versa, we agreed that private property was absolutely guaranteed, and there is complete agreement on this issue. As for public property, a series of unsolved issues remains, but the governments will regulate this, most probably based on the model that has already been reached between Croatia and Slovenia.

Furthermore, we finally agreed on the abolition and amnesty for all acts possibly committed by Bosnian citizens, that is, the members of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Army and the Croatian Defense Council during the clashes, with the exception of persons that have committed war crimes punishable by international law.

[Latinovic] This was on the agenda of today's talks, according to President Izetbegovic. After him, President Tudjman agreed that what President Izetbegovic had said was exactly what the talks were about, and added:

[Tudjman] On behalf of the Croatian state delegation I would like to express my satisfaction above all with the fact that the first meeting of the cooperation council between Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia has been held, and also my satisfaction at the way in which we discussed frankly all the issues which are currently relevant for the revival of both the Washington and the Dayton agreement.

[Latinovic] There are many problems, President Tudjman concluded [words indistinct] but it is encouraging that [words indistinct], and added:

[Tudjman] In my opinion it is vital that, in the work of this council for cooperation, and as a whole, in the revival of the agreements, we should systematically build trust between the Bosniak Muslim and Croat people in the Federation, and consequently between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation, and Croatia since this is in the interests of both the Croat people and, I am convinced — after all [words indistinct] — in the interest of the Bosniak Muslim people, and in the interests not only of ourselves, but also important international players, Europe, and the world.

Therefore, today's first session was constructive [word indistinct] that we started having concrete discussions on various issues, and that we tasked the people in our governments to complete the agreements already prepared so that they can be signed as soon as possible, and to form separate committees for the preparation of the issues yet to be discussed.

I truly believe that this opens a new page not only in the revival of the Washington and Dayton agreements, but also in the relations between the Croat and Bosniak people, and that this is, as I have said, in the interests of both people, peace in the region, and the important international players that support our efforts.

On Croat Police in Mostar

LD0401215896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, on his return to Zagreb, said that the very fact that the founding session of the Council for Mutual Cooperation had been held was a major step toward breathing life into the Dayton Agreement. Here is a report from Zagreb by Nada al-Isa:

[Al-Isa] President Tudjman expressed cautious and moderate optimism at Zagreb airport on his return from Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

On his return to the Presidential Palace, Tudjman had, however, to confront one of the open questions that have to be resolved if life is to be breathed into the Washington and Dayton Agreements, or at least if help is to be provided to breathe life into them.

Immediately prior to the president's return, the Croatian media in fact carried news from Mostar that the Croat police have been withdrawn from the joint patrols with the Bosniak and European police in Mostar, because, it is said, of the increasingly frequent incidents over the past few days, for which the Croats blame the Bosniaks.

Also waiting for Tudjman was a protest from the UNHCR. A UNHCR representative, for the second time in Zagreb today, confirmed that all convoys for central Bosnia are being stopped, pending the abolition of shameful taxes imposed by the Croat authorities in Mostar and that amount to at least $10 per truck, and often more, because the amount of the tax depends on the will of each individual policeman. [passage omitted]

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Bosnian Prisoners Released to French IFOR Troops

AU0401161396 Paris AFP in English 1521 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 4 (AFP) — The 13 Bosnian prisoners detained by the Bosnian Serbs in the Sarajevo area were released Thursday [4 January] at 4 p.m. (15:00 GMT), an AFP reporter present at the scene said.

The information was confirmed by Lt. Col. Richard Pernod, a spokesman for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR).

The detainees were released from the Serb prison of Kula in southwestern Sarajevo to the chief-of-staff of the French Sarajevo brigade, Colonel Thierry Cambournac, Pernod said.

French armoured vehicles transported the ex-detainees to the government held part of Sarajevo where they were handed over to the Bosnian authorities, Pernod said.

Earlier Wednesday the Serbs released three Bosnian prisoners.

Sacirbegovic: Release 'Very Positive'

AU0401203496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jan 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic on the statement by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic following his talks with Admiral Leighton Smith in Sarajevo on 4 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Huseinovic] The 16 Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens detained by Karadzic's Serbs were released today following joint efforts by the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and IFOR [Implementation Force]. Minister Sacirbegovic has this to say on that occasion:

[Sacirbegovic] I would like to thank Admiral Smith for coming to visit us, and for his cooperation over the last few days in solving the problem of people who had disappeared on the road between Ilidza and Sarajevo. I think that this has brought about this positive result: 16 people have been released. I am sorry to say that it appears that there is another person that has not been released, and it appears now that the original number missing was 17.

We have had very positive talks on how to prevent such things from happening in the future, as obviously there will be a problem over the next 90 days, that is, [word indistinct] days after the signature, over how to secure freedom of movement along this road. We should cooperate very closely so that such things do not happen again. However, let me repeat, this is a very positive piece of news for Sarajevo, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for IFOR's mission in the region.

Three More Said 'Abducted'

AU0401202496 Paris AFP in English 1959 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 4 (AFP) — Three Bosnian civilians have gone missing from Serb-held regions of Sarajevo, authorities said Thursday [4 January] shortly after the Bosnian Serbs released 16 others after a week-long crisis.

Bosnian deputy minister for relations with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force Amir Hadziomeragic, told Bosnian television three more people had been abducted by the Bosnian Serbs while one other had apparently not yet been freed.

"It seems that one person has not been freed and that actually 17 civilians and not 16 were arrested on the road to (the Sarajevan suburb) Ilidza," Hadziomeragic said.

"Meanwhile, three other Bosnian civilians, a Serb, a Croat and a Moslem have been abducted by the Serbs," he added.

The Serbs released three prisoners Thursday morning and 13 more Thursday afternoon, ending a week-long crisis which had threatened to damage the Implementation Force's credibility and undermine Bosnia's first tentative steps towards peace.

Muratovic on Release of Civilians

LD0401220796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We are talking to Minister Hasan Muratovic in connection with the imprisonment of 16 civilians, who over the past two weeks have been moving through the territory controlled by the Pale regime. What is your comment on all these events over the past few days — the imprisonment of civilians, IFOR [Implementation Force] conduct in this matter?

[Muratovic] I must first express my satisfaction and gratitude, on behalf of the government and on behalf of the released people and their families, with regard to the efforts and success on the part of senior IFOR officials in the past two days, and senior U.S. officials who resolved the whole matter in a very efficient way.

At the same time, I wish to reject all accusations addressed to me personally and to the government that we were too harsh on those whom we had declared to be guilty. In particular, I wish to let everyone know that this is a case of organized para-state terrorism, which is

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a reaction to all the efforts aimed at calming the situation and [words indistinct] the peace agreement.

In our assessment, everyone is more or less familiar with the conduct of IFOR. Apart from its big successes concerning the military part [of the Dayton Agreement] — that is, the separation of forces — it failed to realize the seriousness of civilian matters. Its members should not have made statements to the effect that they were not responsible, because everyone knows that the entire world is expecting IFOR to open up Sarajevo and ensure freedom of movement for its citizens.

Sacirbegovic on Abductions, IFOR, 'Terrorist' Acts

AU0401164896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Jan 96

[Report by Samir Huseinovic, including statements by Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovicat at a Party of Democratic Action news conference in Sarajevo on 4 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Huseinovic] Muhamed Sacirbegovic, foreign minister of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, spoke about the foreign policy aspects of the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

[Sacirbegovic] When it comes to the implementation of the Dayton agreement, I think that we should concentrate on two important elements. First the military element: It is clear that this is going mostly according to plan. [Word indistinct] we have a very serious and difficult situation and we believe that IFOR [Implementation Force] has still not lived up to its responsibility, that being the 16 people who have disappeared on the road from Ilidza to Sarajevo. Why is this to be considered an element of the implementation? Because IFOR is ultimately responsible for securing freedom of movement.

The other element is what is called the civilian implementation, and this includes a number of issues: Elections, which are supposed to be held under democratic conditions in both entities, and finally, the [word indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage indistinct]

I believe that the second element is far more important, as the first element... [changes thought] It is a purely English term: Stop [previous word in English] for peace. This is what [words indistinct]. On the other hand, what should really establish peace is [word indistinct] and construction, the concept of elections, the return of the refugees, and finally the establishment of democratic institutions.

[Huseinovic] Most of the reporters' questions referred to IFOR's conduct in connection with the terrorizing of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in Ilidza. One Sarajevo reporter had himself witnessed a terrorist act, and asked Minister Sacirbegovic to comment on the conduct of IFOR. They just stood by and watched the inspection and searching of a bus, which was then stoned.

[Sacirbegovic] I will be having talks today with Admiral Smith. This must not happen. This must not happen in front of IFOR. It must not happen. [indistinct shouting in background] I want the information. Bear in mind that I have not had a chance to travel down this route. I want the man who went down it, who has had this experience... [changes thought] I want to discuss this urgently with Admiral Smith. I want all the details. You are right, this must not happen again. The fact that they stopped you and IFOR saw it — something is wrong there.

[Huseinovic] [passage omitted]

French Envoy on Ties, 'Friendship' With Serbs

LD0401212896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2104 GMT 4 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Jan. 4 (TANJUG) — French Ambassador in Bosnia-Herzegovina Yves Gaudeul Thursday [4 January] said in Banja Luka that necessary conditions have been created for cooperation between France and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the initialing of the Dayton Agreement and the signing of the agreement in Paris.

'Between the Serbs and Frenchmen there was friendship and it should be cherished,' he said after talk with Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb republic) Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic.

Kasagic set out that Republika Srpska was determined to implement the Paris Agreement to the full, which infers also free elections within a set period on its territory. 'We are prepared in this respect to cooperate with the corresponding international institutions and organizations,' said Kasagic. He stated the wish for the economic, cultural and other ties, existing between the Frenchmen and Serbs in Bosnia since the beginning of the civil war, to continue.

Mujahidin Unit 'Disbanded'; Might Not Leave

AU0501090596 Paris AFP in English 0051 GMT 5 Jan 96

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zenica, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jan 5 (AFP) — The Bosnian Army has disbanded its

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feared Islamic volunteer unit, an army spokesman said Thursday, but local people and aid workers said many Islamic fighters may end up staying in the country.

"The Islamic unit was disbanded three days ago," Spahir Koslic, spokesman for the Bosnian Army 3rd Corps in Zenica, central Bosnia.

"The Bosnian army is complying with the peace agreement we have signed. Everyone who has to be out of the country will leave by the 13th," the spokesman added.

Under the terms of the Bosnian peace treaty, signed in Paris last month, all the "foreign forces" who have fought in Bosnia over the past four years will have to leave Bosnia by January 13.

The Islamic unit of the Bosnian army, based with the 3rd Corps in Zenica and dubbed the "mujahedeen", was formed in 1993 mainly by fighters from Arab nations.

It fought for the government against Croat and Serb militias.

But since the end of the Moslem-Croat war in 1994 concern about its freelance role in fighting has mounted and it has been regularly accused of harrassing the Moslems' new Croat allies and threatening and sometimes attacking international aid workers.

In the last three months of 1995, mujahedeen fighters had clashes with British and Norwegian aid workers and Bosnian Croat police — incidents in which several have died.

Washington has stepped up pressure on Sarajevo to get the fighters out of the country before the bulk of the US contingent in peacekeeping forces due in Bosnia arrive in nearby Tuzla.

According to local officials, the pressure would appear to have worked.

"A member of the Bosnian military command came here last week and met the commander of the mujahedeen," said Zijad Imamovic, a senior town hall official. "They accepted that it was necessary they should go," he said.

However, while the army, which welcomed the Islamic fighters when it was under heavy attack in 1993, could ask the "foreign" elements of the unit to leave it would not not force Bosnian citizens to leave the country, the official noted.

And many of the people in the unit now were either Bosnians by origin or had married Bosnian women, Imamovic said. The number of "real foreigners" was "limited".

According to aid workers there is "little hard evidence" despite reports to the contrary by NATO forces that the bulk of the mujahedeen are leaving.

"I have no evidence that they are staying and no evidence they have gone," said the head of the UNHCR's Zenica office Monique Tuffelli on Thursday.

A spokesman for the Turkish brigade of NATO troops in Zenica, Captain Ertugrul Gazi, also said he "doubted" whether the fighters would all leave.

Of course, if the Turkish soldiers were asked to force the fighters to leave, they would, he said.

Residents of the mainly Croat village of Podbrijezje a few kilometres (miles) outside Zenica, where they have their base, have regularly complained of threats and intimidation and said Thursday that the threats were continuing.

Jozefina Bobas, a resident of Podbrijezje, told AFP a group of around 10 mujahedeen had left one house in the village that morning. But where they were going, she said, nobody knew.

Bobas doubted they were going for good.

"A lot of the people here were Bosnians who have been converted to Islam," she said. "Why would they go? There is no real pressure. They will just go somewhere else and then maybe come back here," she said.

Six jeeps were moving Thursday morning in and out of the headquarters in the village, showing signs of activity but little evidence of an imminent departure.

Members of the unit were still present — some wearing keffiyeh headscarfs — in the courtyard of the building.

Occupants of one of the cars made threatening signals on seeing a car with international licence plates approach.

Mujahidin Looting Croat Houses

AU0501104196 Paris AFP in English 0954 GMT 5 Jan 96

[By Peter Cunliffe-Jones]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Podbrijezje, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Jan 5 (AFP) — Islamic volunteer fighters leaving their base in a village in central Bosnia are looting Croat houses they took over and occupied when they arrived, residents of the village said this week.

The "mujahedeen" unit of the Bosnian Army is leaving its base in Podbrijezje, a tiny Croat village a few kilometres (miles) north of the town of Zenica. The United States has said it wants the mujahedeen to leave

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Bosnia but it was not certain where the Islamic fighters were heading.

But while they are going, they are taking everything with them, Jozefina Bobas, a 65-year-old Bosnian Croat woman, told AFP Thursday.

"OK, they are leaving, but this morning, they took everything, the fridge, the washing machine, the furniture," from the house they occupied opposite her own home in the village, she said, weeping and shaking with anger.

Podbrijezje, the largest Croat village in the Zenica region of central Bosnia, was until April 1993 home to a unit of the Bosnian Croat HVO militia.

But on April 18, the village was attacked by a unit of the mainly-Moslem Bosnian army and since then has become home to the unit of several hundred Islamic volunteer fighters, known as the mujahedeen, who allied with the mainly-Moslem army.

Under pressure from the authorities, the mujahedeen are now leaving but "no-one" is doing anything to stop them from looting the houses they occupuied, Bobas said.

"They did this half an hour ago," she told AFP Thursday, pointing to the abandoned house opposite her own. "It was my brother's house and they took everything," she said.

"They were insulting us and swearing and took all my poor brother's things. The last year has been a nightmare," she said.

Local officials in Zenica admit that there have been "problems" with the over-zealous Islamic fighters — many of them coming from abroad in 1993 but more coming from Bosnia as converts to the Islamic cause, Bobas said.

Zijad Imamovic, head of the mayor's office in Zenica, said he had known of problems caused by the Islamic fighters. But now they were leaving, he said.

"We know they are going," said Bobas in Podbrijezje. "But we don't know where." [passage omitted]

At the nearby headquarters of the Turkish brigade of the peacekeeping Implementation Force, an IFOR spokesman Captain Ertugrul Gazi, admitted that the local Croats had often complained of being threatened by Islamic fighters.

But, apart from more patrols, there was little he could do, he said.

"We ourselves, didn't have a problem with the mujahedeen," the captain said.

"We didn't want to see them. They didn't want to see us."

"They disturb the Croat people here. And try to get them to leave.

"But there was little we could do," he said.

According to a Matica Botic, a 46-year-old Croat neighbour of the Bobas family, the mujahedeen have looted other homes in the village which they have started to leave.

"It is a matter for the international police we are supposed to get. But who expects those police to come here," she said.

Hague Prosecutor on Eventual Arrest of 'Serb Duo'

AU0401171696 Paris AFP in English
1655 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels, Jan 4 (AFP) — The prosecutor of a UN war crimes tribunal moved to allay fears that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his army chief General Ratko Mladic will escape arrest for their part in the Bosnian conflict, the Belgian daily LE SOIR said Thursday.

Richard Goldstone, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal on former Yugoslavia in The Hague, told the daily that it was simply a matter of time before the Serb duo were arrested to face war crimes charges.

Goldstone was quoted by LE SOIR as saying the NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) would, in time, arrest all 52 military and civilian officials indicted by the tribunal, including Karadzic and Mladic.

He said that while the details of such an operation had still to be worked out, the Serb leaders still faced international arrest warrants for their part in atrocities committed during the three-and-a-half year war, and had little space in which to avoid IFOR patrols and checkpoints.

If the Serb leaders so much as crossed an IFOR position they would be arrested on the spot, Goldstone said.

He also said IFOR could put pressure on neighbouring Croatia and Serbia to comply with the terms of the peace accord and extradite suspected war criminals on their soil.

Under the Bosnian peace accord, signed in Paris on December 14, the 45 Serbs and seven Croats indicted by the Hague court will not be allowed to hold office in the postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina and will be actively pursued by the 60,000-strong IFOR contingent.

But the Bosnian government has expressed scepticism that the 45 Serbs and seven Croats will be brought to justice, and earlier this week Germany called for

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the signatories to the peace accord to keep up the momentum in the hunt for suspected war criminals.

Russia moved last month to force the tribunal to suspend its action against Karadzic and Mladic, but the court rejected the bid.

Bildt Meets RS Officials in 'Constructive' Talks

LD0401152996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1442 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 4 Jan (SRNA) — Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for civilian affairs in the union of the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS] and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, described his talks today with the RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic and Vice President Biljana Plavsic as good and constructive.

"We talked about setting up various commissions and about economic issues, the issues of refugees and humanitarian aid as well as about your country's future relations with other European countries," Bild said. He continued: "I wanted to visit Banja Luka and speak to Prime Minister Kasagic in order to establish closer cooperation. Earlier I had a meeting in Pale with other government members. We shall have many problems in peacetime, but they are nevertheless more pleasant than those encountered in war."

Bildt said that the problem of Serb Sarajevo had again been raised. He said that "Sarajevo must be the town of future for anyone who wishes to live in it."

"The right of all people and civilians must be safeguarded and the international community will pay particular attention to it. We shall take practical steps to achieve this," the Swedish diplomat said giving no further explanation.

Discusses Peace With Kasagic

AU0401162396 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Jan 96

[Report by Branislav Bozic in Banja Luka]

[FBIS Translated Text] I am very satisfied with what has been achieved so far on the military level in the implementation of the peace agreement, senior EU envoy for Bosnia-Herzegovina Carl Bildt stated in Banja Luka today, emphasizing again that the key to the peace lay in the hands of all three peoples. Carl Bildt discussed economic revival, refugees, and the humanitarian situation. He assessed the talks as constructive and the problems that need solving as difficult; however, he said they were infinitely easier that the war itself, and for that reason he was optimistic. He said about Sarajevo that it must be everyone's town, expressing understanding for the fears of the Serbian population that live there.

[Bosnian Serb] Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic also voiced his satisfaction with today's meeting. He stressed that the future of the Serb Republic lay in its economy and any other sort of link with the world. Carl Bildt conveyed support and encouragement for such an orientation.

Listens to Demands for 'First Time'

LD0401164696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1442 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Jan (SRNA) — Mirko Sarovic, president of the executive committee of the Novo Sarajevo municipality, has said that at his meeting last night Carl Bildt, emissary for civilian affairs, "for the first time listened to concrete Serb demands."

Sarovic told SRNA that one could "understand from the talks that the deadlines for the implementation of the agreement would be shifted to when the elections are held, most proably at the end of this year."

According to him, talks are in progress in order to "pave the way for a meeting between the Serb Republic, the Muslim side, and representatives of the international community, at which the future status of Sarajevo would be resolved in direct talks."

SRNA's correspondent in Grbavica reports that the Serbs who today crossed from the Muslim part of the city into the Serb part of the city have testified that the Muslims in Hotonj, above Vogosca, set fire to all Serb houses there over the past 10 days, as they feared the return of people who until recently had been their neighbors.

Delic Stresses Need for Army Combat Readiness

AU0401201496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A regular informative session was held today for the officers of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which was attended by the officers of the 1st Corps of our army.

Army General Rasim Delic, Bosnia-Herzegovina Army chief of the General Staff, and the representatives of some departments in the General Staff presented some information regarding the main activities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army considering its obligations in the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton agreement. This is said in the statement by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Press Center.

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It was assessed that this year the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will have several complex and mutually dependent tasks, on which the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina will depend, as well as the future organization and functioning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, that is, the future federal army. Analyzing these tasks, Army Gen. Rasim Delic stressed:

The peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the military agreement within it, sets tasks before the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that it has to perform within very short and precisely defined deadlines. These are tasks that, in simple terms, amount to a 2 km withdrawal from the separation line, the demining of certain areas, a regime within the 10 km zone, and — after 120 days — a withdrawal to barracks and other defined areas, alongside preserving the combat readiness that will guarantee that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can, at any moment, take on the responsibility of the defense of the borders, that is, the territory controlled by the Federation. This is a very difficult and complex task, as one has to keep in mind that the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which according to the statements of our statesmen has brought peace to the region, does not make peace certain in military terms. Any relaxation could be catastrophic. Therefore, we have to undertake all these measures, and guarantee full safety, security, and full combat readiness, which is very important and hard.

On Army Tasks in Implementing Peace

LD0401204096 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovina in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A regular briefing session by officers in the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was also attended by officers of the Army 1st Corps, was held in Sarajevo today. In contributions by Army General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff, and some of the representatives of the General Staff administration, information was provided on the main activities of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, especially in view of its obligations to implement the military part of the Dayton agreement.

It was assessed that this year the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has several complex and mutually interdependent tasks, upon which the implementation of the peace agreement and the future prospects for the functioning of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the future of a federal army depend. Analyzing these tasks, Gen. Delic said:

[Begin Delic recording] The signing of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina — one of the main parts of which is the military aspect of the peace agreement, and above all Annex 1A and Annex 1B— means that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is faced with tasks which must be carried out within very short and precisely defined deadlines.

These are tasks which at the same time require a 2 km withdrawal from the front lines, the clearing of mines from certain areas, [word indistinct] functioning within a 10 km zone, withdrawal to barracks or designated areas within 120 days, and at the same time the securing of combat readiness, which would guarantee that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is ready at any moment to take responsibility for the defense of the borders and the territory controlled by the Federation.

This is very difficult and complex. You should know that the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, as our statesmen have said, has brought peace to this area... [pauses] I, as a soldier, can say that this is not yet certain. On the contrary, any relaxation could have catastrophic consequences. We must, while carrying out all these measures, guarantee full alertness and security and the highest level of combat readiness. This is very important and difficult.

However, these two processes which are being carried out and which relate to the Army in connection with confidence-building measures and the balance of armaments, are also very important to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and [two-second break in transmission] assumptions about the kind of army we will have in 1996 depend on them. The confidence-building measures are roughly speaking a process, the aim of which is to cleanse the borders, not the real, factual borders, but the human borders and links between the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and between the military formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Generally speaking, this is the process which has been in operation, as the Washington agreements, between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council].

This is a process which should be settled, according to the documents, by 26 January and implemented further in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is possible that this institution, which has been set up by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will remain in being even after the departure of IFOR [Implementation Force], and until it fulfills its obligations.

The second process is the balance of heavy weapons and military power. We in the General Staff and the Corps Headquarters have embarked on this process and all these processes in an organized manner. We did not embark on them without a specific plan. But we embarked on them with those activities which we can plan. [end recording]

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Croat Official Views IFOR, Federation Issues

AU0401171996 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jan 96 pp 30-32

[Interview with Vladimir Soljic, minister of defense of the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "We Will Implement the Dayton Agreement Completely"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since the peace agreement was reached in Dayton and signed in Paris, many people feel Bosnia-Herzegovina is entering a new period in its history, however, experience tells us that nothing should be accepted as an accomplished fact. The only thing that is sure is that Bosnia, together with Herzegovina, is entering a new year. And whether 1996 will differ from previous years is yet to be seen. In any case, at the end of 1995, the establishment of new relations in all the territories began. Vladimir Soljic, present minister of defense of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and candidate for the president of the Federation of the Croats and Muslims, can surely tell us a lot about those relations. He was nominated for the office of Federation president by the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina after Kresimir Zubak's resignation.

[Soljic] Before answering any question referring to the present situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we must step back in history, to try to find the reasons for all this. An inevitable question is why has such a small area been an object of such huge interest for the most significant world factors for such a long time, and why particularly now? Why, instead of the peoples living on these territories solving their problems and organizing their relations, do the others, like their patrons, shape the state in which those peoples will live? How can we explain such shows, and the importance that is given to the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when almost all the significant world statesmen are present when truces are signed but, at the same time, those to whom the truces refer are not enthusiastic at all about them? Those are the questions that, even without answers, describe the situation, the different interpretations, and the whole complexity of the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that light, the Dayton peace agreement has to be understood as a painful compromise, as the starting point of different interests, and the real power behind the direct participants; the Croats, the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the big world powers.

[Karacic] The new NATO forces have been arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina. More than 25,000 troops wearing IFOR [Implementation Force] insignia are already here. What will be the result of all this?

[Soljic] After the arrival of the NATO forces, there are the same prospects for peace, the continuation of the war, and the reintegration of all the territories into a united legal and state system or for the total and definite end of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that the internal relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be essentially influenced by the mutual recognition and normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia.

[Karacic] Where are the Croats in this net of conflicts and interests? What is their position?

[Soljic] Because the Croats are scattered all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, from the area along the southern border of Croatia, where they constitute an absolute majority, through central Bosnia, where they constitute approximately 50 percent of the population, to the area where they are a minority. Bosnian Posavina is a special case now. There is also a special situation in the Croatian enclaves such as Zepce and Vares. It is hard to find a solution that would satisfy all the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While some would only be satisfied with joining the Croatian state, others think that achieving equality within Bosnia-Herzegovina in the regions with a Croatian majority would be a good solution. A third group would be satisfied with any of the variants, except for an association with Serbia.

[Karacic] What can be done to satisfy the interests of them all to a certain degree?

[Soljic] I hope that, finally, we are facing a period of peace, however, we are also facing an important battle for our interests using other means. A complex and difficult transition from war to peacetime is before us, as well as the painstaking process of organizing the future state. The future of that state, as well as the future of the Croats in it, will largely depend upon the way in which it is organized. Only the equality of the nations and good living conditions can provide for a lasting peace and for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats have practically achieved two national objectives. The internationally recognized state of Croatia has been created and, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats have won the status of a constituent nation equal to the other nations. A strong and stable Croatian state is the guarantee for the survival and equality of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Karacic] The Croats succeeded in the struggle for their own interests and preservation in the past years of hardships thanks also to the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. There is a fear that, with the extinction of Herzeg-Bosnia as an authority related to public law, the safety of the Croats will also disappear. Is that fear justified?

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[Soljic] The Croatian Community — and, later, the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia — justified its existence completely. The task of defense against the aggressor was fulfilled successfully. Later, everyday life was organized, and almost all the Croat territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been liberated. Were it not for the self-organization of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the universal help of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian diaspora, there would certainly be no Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The functions of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia will be taken over by the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which both the Croats and the Bosniaks will participate equally. Therefore, those who rejoice maliciously at the extinction of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia have no reason for their joy, nor do those who have had their defense, protection, and full safety in the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia have any reason to worry.

[Karacic] The establishment of the Federation after the signing of the Washington treaties went beyond all expectations. And then it had got stuck on the questions that were also discussed in Dayton. The agreement is to be confirmed in the Constituent Assembly. What will develop now, after the peace agreement, after Dayton and Paris?

[Soljic] It is time to adopt the laws that are most important for the Federation, like, for instance, the Law on Government, the Law on Ministries, the Law on Defense, the Law on Internal Affairs... The talks between the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] regarding relations between the two nations and the distribution of military, state, and political duties have also been accelerated. In all this, the relations between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the political and economic fields are very important. According to the Dayton agreement, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina should not exist in its present form. The Ministerial Council will take its place. When the functioning of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina comes to an end, the functioning of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia will also end. However, one cannot hide the fact that the Bosniak side wants to keep as many functions at the level of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible and wants to extinguish the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia as soon as possible, and then, in some way, present that as a reintegration.

[Karacic] Are the Croats going to accept that?

[Soljic] We do not have to accept that. The Dayton agreements do not charge us with that. We will stick to the Dayton agreement, which envisages the introduction of the Ministerial Council and a resolute division of the functions of the Government of the Federation and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have already held a lot of talks on this with the Bosniak side, and we are not far from finding a solution. There will be five or six ministers in the Ministerial Council and the prime minister. Their function will be to preserve the continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the engagement of the Serb side in the whole process. Most of the functions of authority will be taken over by the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Karacic] What representation will the Croats have in the federal government?

[Soljic] We have also been discussing that with the Bosniak side. There should be no major problems. The number of ministries will probably remain unchanged, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will merge with the Ministerial Council. As envisaged by the Vienna agreement, at least one-third of the offices belong to the Croats. There are no obstacles to the number of ministerial seats that will fall to the Croats being greater. Four ministries will be situated in Mostar. New buildings will probably be constructed for those ministries in the demolished borderline part of Mostar. Both the president of the Federation and the prime minister of the Government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina should have their offices there.

[Karacic] Now that we are talking about Mostar, what can you tell us about its position after the attempt of the EU administration to turn that town into, as one colleague used to say, a "cosmopolitan rose garden"?

[Soljic] It was a delusion to treat Mostar as an exception. The relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been reflected in the situation in Mostar because neither the Croat nor the Bosniak leadership in Mostar can make decisions without the participation of the highest political leaders of both nations. Those who view this emotionlessly, like machines, those who have come here, simply cannot understand this. They think that it is normal to integrate. In the economic sense, it is all right, but how does one integrate into one class the pupils whose fathers have shot each other or put to work together the people who, until yesterday, shot at each other? We think, and this has proved to be justified, that it takes time. The false relationship of brotherhood and unity will never return. It will be possible to settle relations, but on the basis of clean accounts and the rights of both nations.

[Karacic] Would you perhaps say that the time has not yet come for some processes on which the Bosniak side insists persistently?

[Soljic] There is a lot of propaganda. Mostar is an old town. It was known throughout the world even before

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this war. During this war, it has constantly been at the center of media attention. The Bosniak side has known how to use that. They often invite Croats to return to the left bank of the Neretva River, back to the houses or apartments from which they were banished. To strangers, that looks like a gesture of goodwill, but, it is only throwing dust in their eyes. Why invite people to return to their homes? It is normal for everyone to wants to return home. It is also normal to ask why people do not get to return home. Because, under the current circumstances, one simply cannot live there. When the conditions for that are created, then everybody who wants to return to their homes will do so.

[Karacic] You have already said that the relations within Bosnia-Herzegovina will depend largely upon mutual recognition and the normalization of the relations between Croatia and Serbia. There is no doubt that one will also have to sit at the negotiating table with the Serbs. Have there been such meetings?

[Soljic] Our stand is clear: The Dayton agreement is to be implemented completely. We will try to create the relations at this level with the Serb side. That means to realize freedom of movement and the return of refugees — those who want to return, of course. We will adhere strictly to what is written in the Dayton agreement, and, regard that, our stand will be the same both toward both the Serb and toward the Bosniak side.

[Karacic] IFOR has already been deploying its troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So far, no objections have been filed with the Croat side regarding cooperation with IFOR. What do we have to thank for that?

[Soljic] We recognized the role and the mandate of those forces in time. Regardless of how painful it is to welcome a foreign army onto our own territory, it is better to accept it as reality than to oppose it. The Serb and Bosniak sides have tried that, and the Bosniaks have paid for that with the deaths of two military policemen at a checkpoint in the vicinity of Tuzla. The Serbs have had more luck, because they have only lost their checkpoints. We have given detailed instructions to our military and civilian police on how to behave toward IFOR members. If anyone tries to do anything on his own, he will suffer the consequences. That would be against the interests of the Croat people.

[Karacic] The Serbs have requested the postponement of the withdrawal of their troops from Sarajevo. The Bosniaks, too, have made requests to NATO. The Croat side is fulfilling its obligation to leave certain territories, especially those in northwestern Bosnia. How would you comment on that?

[Soljic] We will implement the Dayton agreement, but we are not so naive as to rush ahead recklessly and to anything beyond the general developments. If the Serb side will delay the withdrawal from Odzak and other places, then we will not leave the surroundings of Sipovo. We have surrendered important plants, like the Bocac hydroelectric power plant, to the control of the British, in order to avoid any manipulation or any attempt by provocateurs to cause damage there and blame it on the Croats. Otherwise, the hydroelectric plant in Bocac has not stopped its activity. We have regularly supplied electricity to the Serbs, although we could have switched it off at any time. But we simply did not want to cause problems for the Serb population in the Bosnian Krajina by such blackmail.

[Karacic] Unlike this nice gesture, nevertheless, different pictures of the Croats have been shown in the world. Day after day, foreign media have broadcast pictures of burning Serb houses in Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo.

[Soljic] One cannot say that there was no destruction and arson. However, one has to put it into perspective. First, the Army, which suffered a lot of casualties during the liberation of those territories and which achieved a great victory, was very disappointed to have to return that area to the Serbs peacefully and without any justification. A common soldier's reasoning is that it is unjust that the Serbs, who constitute only 33 percent of the Bosnia-Herzegovina population, should win 49 percent of the territory. Some of the houses were burned by the army, and no one could have stopped that. Some of them, however, were burned by civilians, both Croat and Bosniak, when they found out that they would not be able to stay there. Some Croats have moved out four times since their banishment from central Bosnia to Sipovo. Some Bosniaks, who, after so many pains and the terror suffered under Serb authority, finally welcomed the liberation and hoped that everything would be all right. When they found out that they had to move out, they could not bear the frustration. So, there were also situations in which people burned their own houses. However, that is already the past. The situation is under control, and no more houses are being set on fire.

EU: Mostar Process 'Has Again Been Halted'

AU0401195396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the initial promise of improvement of the situation in Mostar, particularly the establishment of a greater freedom of movement, the Mostar process has again been halted, says the statement issued by the EU administration in Mostar.

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The definition of the borders of the six city districts is the main obstacle in the normalization. The Bosniaks and the Croats do nor behave and think as partners in the Federation but as former and — as it literally says in the statement — potential future enemies that have to separate and define their property. Despite the decrees by the administrator, the safety situation has not improved, and over Christmas we even had the first case of sniper fire at the east part of Mostar.

The Croat leaders say that they will not abide by imposed rules, says the statement on the general situation in Mostar issued today by Koschnick's administration.

UN Struggles To Find Officers for Police Force

AU0501090096 Paris AFP in English 0226 GMT 5 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations, Jan 4 (AFP) — The United Nations has managed to find only one third of a 1,721-strong international civilian police force for Bosnia despite contacting some 50 governments, sources here said Thursday.

The International Police Task Force, whose role is to train and monitor local police in Bosnia, was set up under the Dayton accords signed by the warring parties in November. The deadline for creating the force runs out at the end of the week.

About a dozen states, including Nordic countries, France and some Asian countries, have informed the United Nations that they were ready to contribute, totalling around 600 men, diplomats said.

Some sources said that 200 Nepalese policemen may be contributed and did not rule out a US presence in the force.

Earlier Thursday, UN spokeswoman in Belgrade Susan Manuel said that only 40 of the police officers due in Bosnia were currently in place, although a further 60 were expected to come from Croatia.

The difficulties, linked to delayed international financing, were also holding up the nomination of UN liaison officers in Croatia and Bosnia, she said.

UN spokeswoman Sylvana Foa, referring to the difficulties encountered, acknowledged here that it was hard for countries to release policemen "as they are normally used full time." Retired officers were therefore being contacted, she added.

UN sources stress that the task force is not responsible for law enforcement in Bosnia. NATO's Implementation Force in Bosnia also refuses responsibility for law enforcement, but nevertheless on Thursday secured the release of 16 Bosnian civilians abducted in a Serb-held Sarajevo suburb.

Serb Republic Producing Surplus of Electricity

LD0401162596 Pale Srpski Radio-Televizija Studio Sarajevo Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Ugljevik thermoelectric plant has resumed regular production of electricity, and this means that the recent difficultly in electricity supply in our republic has been overcome. Here is a report by Petar Lekic in Ugljevik.

[Lekic] The Ugljevik thermoelectric plant has been operating in a very stable way at between 70 and 75 percent capacity since 24 November, when it came on stream again after having been at a standstill for three years of the war. Each day it produces between 4 and 4.5 kilowatt hours or about 100 million kilowatt hours of electricity per month.

The reconnection to the grid of the Ugljevik thermoelectric plant means that the Serb Republic is producing more electricity than it requires, so there is some left over for export. At present, about 130 megawatts is flowing toward Krajina, about 50 megawatts is flowing toward Bijeljina, and about 20 megawatts toward Zvornik and Serbia, while 10 megawatts of electricity remains in Ugljevik.

Currently about 300 workers are engaged in electricty production at the plant. If the plant was working at full capacity, about 560 workers would be employed. So those workers who are currently at work are doing 12-hour shifts. This is how things will remain until the necessary number of workers are released from their military duties. [passage omitted]

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Tudjman Returns From Sarajevo Meeting, Comments

LD0401183296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, returned to Zagreb from Sarajevo this afternoon. While in Sarajevo, in keeping with the Dayton Agreement, he presided at the first session of the council for cooperation among Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. This is what he said on arrival at Zagreb airport:

[Begin Tudjman recording] The mere fact that the first session of the council for cooperation among Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation has been held—this fact alone represents a big step forward in terms of the effective breathing of life into the Washington and Dayton Agreements. We discussed many issues frankly and the point was clearly made that all open questions should be resolved from the point of view of creating trust between the Croat and the Bosniak Muslim peoples, because this is in the interests of both sides—the Croatian state and the Croatian people as a whole and the Bosniak Muslim people and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. [end recording]

UNHCR Officials Meet Amnestied Serbs

LD0401211496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2055 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 4 (TANJUG)—Representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) met on Thursday [4 January] with 349 amnestied Serbs at a collection centre at Gasinci near Osijek, East Croatia, to ascertain where they want to go.

The UNHCR Belgrade office told TANJUG on Thursday that the Serbs, amnestied by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on New Year's Eve, would be turned over to Yugoslav authorities on the weekend.

The list submitted by Zagreb to the UNHCR Belgrade office gives the names of 348 men and one woman.

TANJUG was told that all the Serbs were still in 'temporary lockup', guarded by Croatian police.

When the Croatian Army invaded the Republic of Serb Krajina in August of 1995, it took prisoner about 1,000 Serbs who have been in Croatian jails ever since. The Croatian president's New Year decree amnestied 455 of them, according to Croatian sources.

The UNHCR has information that 451 people have been amnestied, 102 of whom have opted to stay in Croatia, and the others are at the Gasinci collection centre pending transportation to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro).

Seks: Rapid Disarmament Test of Serb Sincerity

AU0301132996 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 23-26 Dec 95 pp 11-12

[Interview with Vladimir Seks, deputy speaker of the National Assembly and member of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] Presidency, by Branko Podgornik; place and date not given: "Croatia Has American Guarantees for Rapid Reintegration of Eastern Croatia"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Butrus Butrus-Ghali Is Buying Time for Serbia

[Podgornik] Why is it not possible for Croatia to continue with the peace process in this region if the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not recognize Croatia as a state?

[Seks] There is a very strong tendency in the international community to separate the issue of state crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the issue of realizing Croatia's territorial integrity. In addition, Bosnia-Herzegovina is seen as a burning issue with a bigger specific weight, whereas the latter issue is being thrust aside. Therefore, even before Dayton, Croatia had asked for the problem of its integrity to be solved in one and the same package with the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within that package we also asked for a model for reintegration of other occupied territories.

We warned that the necessary condition for implementing the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, which preceded Dayton, was the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, which includes mutual diplomatic recognition. The exclusion of that recognition would mean that Serbia has not given up its territorial pretensions, and its intention to separate that area from Croatia, after a possible freezing of the status quo of eastern Croatia. That is why Croatia has been given guarantees, in particular American guarantees, that the process of reintegrating eastern Croatia will proceed very quickly.

Belgrade changed its mind at the last moment, however, and expressed territorial pretensions towards Croatia, demanding Prevlaka.

From the fact that Belgrade expressed territorial demands towards Croatia at the last moment, it is clear that in its policy there are still some very strong forces that oppose the normalization and the recognition of Croatia. From that it can be concluded that there are still strong forces in Belgrade that want to freeze the

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situation on the territory of eastern Croatia and to separate that territory from Croatia.

They are looking for international allies in this. There are some significant circles in Europe and on the level of the United Nations that—starting from the theory of reducing the risk to the smallest possible extent—are planning to pacify this area so as to be able to concentrate on Bosnia-Herzegovina. They suppose that the large concentration of soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina will at the same time tie Croatia's hands regarding possible intervention.

The UN secretary general's recent proposal means a complete revision of the political agreement in Dayton and the Basic Agreement. Such a proposal means buying time for Serbia and for the Serbs on the occupied territories of Croatia for an indefinite period of time. They believe that by changing the demographic picture on that territory and playing with referendums and autonomies, they can copy the situation from Bosnia-Herzegovina onto Croatia—the situation of a formally integral state but with a "Serbian Republic."

Croatia, which plays a significant role in southeast Europe, cannot accept a unilateral implementation of the Dayton agreement. It cannot agree to support one key part of the Dayton agreement if at the same time the political engineering disregards the solution of the question of its territorial integrity.

Either Disarmament and Reintegration Together, Or....

[Podgornik] How do you assess the announcements published in some of our papers that Croatia will start a rapid military action in February if peaceful reintegration has not moved from its current standstill?

[Seks] For Croatia the swift and accurate implementation of disarmament in eastern Croatia is a key test of Belgrade's political will, of the political will of the military and political leadership of Serbs in eastern Croatia, and of the political will of the Security Council and of what we call the international community.

[Podgornik] How many months can Croatia wait for that disarmament?

[Seks] We insist on its being implemented immediately upon the establishment of the international administration, lead by a retired U.S. general. We have insisted on transforming the forces of UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] into international forces, strengthened by the Slovak battalion. Those forces have to implement disarmament in thirty days.

Any resistance to disarmament, any tolerance of such resistance and inaction on disarmament would clearly show that the international forces are not prepared to implement disarmament, that the Serbs in that area are also not prepared to do it, and Belgrade neither. That would be a clear sign that nothing can come out of the Basic Agreement and that the Serbs and Belgrade are not prepared to carry out the peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into Croatia.

In that case Croatia would once again have to face an important decision. It would be in the situation it was in before "Flash" and "Storm." Croatian decisions will depend on whether rapid disarmament is brought about.

[Podgornik] Does that mean that some loose pieces in the mosaic of the peace agreement for this region—like eastern Croatia—could ruin the whole mosaic?

[Seks] It could seriously affect and endanger the peace agreement because Croatia agreed to the peace process in good faith and with international guarantees, because of the protection of its vital interests, in order to prevent war and new human and material losses.

[Podgornik] However, international circles keep stressing one thing only—the peoples of this region want peace....

[Seks] Peace is certainly in the Croatian people's interest, but the sort of peace that would endlessly postpone Croatia's integrity. On the Croatian side there are no mental reserves relating to implementating the Basic Agreement. If there is such a reserve in Belgrade, in the political and military leadership of the Serbs in eastern Croatia, and in the international community, that means that somebody acted in bad faith. No agreement is valid if someone acted in bad faith.

[Podgornik] Do you wish to say something to the readers at the end?

[Seks] I wish everybody a Merry Christmas and a successful New Year.

Iranian Envoy Comments on Dayton, Mujahidin

AU0401142896 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 29 Dec 95 p 11-12

["Exclusive" interview with Mohammad Javad Asayesh Zarebi, Iranian ambassador to Croatia, by Srecko Jurdana at the Iranian Embassy in Zagreb; date not given: "The Americans Talk of Iranian Mujahidin in Bosnia But They Finance Them and Support Their Terrorist Actions!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Mohammad Javad Asayesh Zarebi has been the Iranian ambassador to Zagreb for

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three years. He arrived in Zagreb in October 1992, having previously served as ambassador to Belgrade for four years. Obviously, he is an experienced expert on Balkan matters. Mr. Zarebi agreed to comment on the Dayton accord for NACIONAL and to express his views on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations between the Croats and Muslims, and the position of Iran on the mujahidin phenomenon, which has become particularly topical following the recent incident near Zepca in which five Islamic warriors were killed. Our interview took place at the Iranian Embassy in Zagreb.

[Jurdana] Mr. Ambassador, what is your position on the Dayton agreement? Do you think that the agreement has any positive aspects, or it is merely a confirmation of the permanent division of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zarebi] We support the agreement. It was late in being reached and it is unfair but, despite that, we support it, because it will create a much better situation in Bosnia than was the case before. Peace is coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have always supported the decisions of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so we support it in this case, too. It is at the same time clear that the agreement is not fair toward the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regions and towns in which Muslims were in the majority will remain in Serb hands, according to the agreement. But, despite this, we support it because it represents an agreement of the conflicting sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Jurdana] Do you think that the survival of the state of Bosnia- Herzegovina is possible after the Dayton agreement?

[Zarebi] We think that the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preserved by this agreement and this is the agreement's most positive aspect.

[Jurdana] How do you view the existence of the recognized "Serb Republic" within that?

[Zarebi] I repeat, the international identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preserved by the agreement and Bosnia-Herzegovina gets much better conditions for survival than it had before. The conflicting sides were trying to tear Bosnia-Herzegovina apart, but they failed. I know that there are difficulties and problems, but the integrity of the state has been preserved. I expect that those countries that have come up with the present peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina will watch over the preservation of its integrity. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a member of the United Nations and it must survive as such.

Integrity of State Preserved

[Jurdana] Which factors will tend to strengthen the implementation of the agreement—the integrative or disintegrative ones? The Serbs still do not recognize the state of Bosnia. Will the autonomy of the "Serb Republic" overpower their nominal affiliation to the common state?

[Zarebi] The international players have promised to preserve the integrity of the state and that promise is stronger than the separatist tendencies. We hope that in Bosnia-Herzegovina all the ethnic groups will continue to live together. If Europe is looking for the best social model for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then it should look to Iran. Muslims form 98 percent of the population, but there are four official state religions, which are perfectly equal: Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism. Representatives of all the faiths are present in Iran's Chamber of Representatives. In our country there is coexistence among religions and coexistence with our neighboring countries. We expect that in Bosnia such coexistence between Muslims and Christians will also develop.

[Jurdana] Nevertheless, how do you personally feel about the fact that the brutal aggressor, Serbia, has emerged not only unpunished but also rewarded? Is it a defeat for the international order?

[Zarebi] The international community reacted mildly and tardily to the aggression. The international community should have halted the aggression at the very beginning. Unfortunately, the Dayton agreement respects the military situation achieved and observes, above all, the balance of power between the conflicting sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreement does not impose justice. Therefore the Serbs were given an exceptionally large number of concessions.

[Jurdana] Do you think that the Serbs enjoy significant support from some countries and that this has been reflected in the agreement?

[Zarebi] Some countries have been supporting the Serbs from the very outset and, therefore, they have been given many concessions now. But we hope that with this agreement peace will return to this part of the world.

[Jurdana] Do you, perhaps, have the impression that the Islamic world has in general done very little for Bosnia? Do you think that the Islamic world could have put more pressure on the international centers of power to achieve a more just peace?

[Zarebi] The Islamic world has tried to do what it could, but the final decision was made by the more powerful countries. The Islamic Contact Group was created,

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which has influenced the Contact Group of Europe. Iran, too, has played a part there. But the agreement was defined by the Western, not the Islamic countries. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government has accepted it and so we support it, but this peace is not a just one. Nevertheless, it is better than war.

The Muhajidin Are Propaganda

[Jurdana] Are you also thinking of a political, and not only an economic, reconstruction of the country?

[Zarebi] The United States has become the largest international factor in this region and it must fulfill all its promises from the negotiations in Dayton.

[Jurdana] What do you think of the role of the foreign Islamic fighters, or muhajidin, in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army? It seems that they will soon have to withdraw from this army. Also, what is your comment on the confrontations between the muhajidin and the Croatian forces in Bosnia? Could they, in your opinion, lead to a new Croat-Muslim war?

[Zarebi] We believe that relations between the Muslims and Croats will improve with every day. We were trying to draw them closer together even when the conflict between them was at its peak. I think that we succeeded in that and had good cooperation from the Governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are sorry about the incident in Zepca and hope that it will not happen again. You asked me about the muhajidin. They are the product of Western propaganda. In Iran there is only one group that calls itself muhajidin and it is an enemy of the Iranian Government. They are terrorists and have assassinated many Iranian officials. These muhajidin enjoy the support of the U.S. Government. During the Iranian revolution they stood up against the Iranian people, carried out bombings in towns, and killed many innocent people. In the end, many of them escaped from Iran and today live in the West. They are supported by the United States and other Western countries. We have been asking for their extradition from these countries, for them to be returned to Iran to be put on trial and to be punished in the way that they deserve. What I want to say is that the muhajidin issue is one of propaganda, not of reality. There is not a single Iranian among the muhajidin in Bosnia.

[Jurdana] Do you think that an intelligence operation of some Western agencies, aimed at provoking a Croat-Muslim conflict, could lie behind the muhajidin phenomenon?

[Zarebi] There will be no new Croat-Muslim conflicts, nor will they be provoked by any kind of muhajidin because Iran, as the most powerful Islamic country, will not allow it any more than the Governments of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will. Our joint cooperation between Iran, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is very good.

[Jurdana] Forgive my persistence, but could it be that the muhajidin are the agents of some Western intelligence structures? You said that in Iran they enjoy Western support.

[Zarebi] I have not given any particular thought to the possibility of the muhajidin being used as agents by Western intelligence services, but I do know that the muhajidin in Iran have already been used in this way. They have killed many people and have done so under someone's orders. The West controls those Iranians who present themselves as the muhajidin and uses them as Western spies. I cannot comment on muhajidin from other countries, but I do know that the Iranian ones are under control and that is Western control.

[Jurdana] Do you know where the centers of the Iranian muhajidin are?

[Zarebai] In Paris and Baghdad.

[Jurdana] Are their logistics centers there?

[Zarebi] Paris and Baghdad are well known bases of the Iranian muhajidin where they are organized into terrorist groups to carry out assassinations, to plan and carry out the whole of their terrorist and espionage activity, as ordered by Western intelligence agencies. They have killed many Iranian politicians and ordinary people.

[Jurdana] So who, in fact, are the muhajidin in Bosnia?

[Zarebi] I do not know who they are. We only know that Bosnia-Herzegovina does not need any soldiers, as it has enough of its own. It needs military equipment. Not a single man from Iran has arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because it does not need human reinforcements. I do not know where the muhajidin who are there come from.

Iranian Help for Bosnia-Herzegovina

[Jurdana] After Dayton, does Iran intend to help Bosnia-Herzegovina in military and economic matters?

[Zarebi] We will assist the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina if the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government requests it and tells us which regions need help. We are ready to help at any moment. That also refers to Croatia. The first assistant to the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran will soon be holding talks with the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina prime ministers, in which they will be discussing ways of helping in the reconstruction.

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[Jurdana] Does that also involve military help to Bosnia, after the embargo has been lifted?

[Zarebi] As I have already said, it depends upon what the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government requests.

[Jurdana] Does the Islamic Republic of Iran consider both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to be allies to the same degree?

[Zarebi] We have good relations with both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both countries are great friends of ours. We are not here because of some special political or economic interests; we are here as a friend of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have achieved significant successes in drawing Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina closer together, in ending the war, and in improving their relations. We have influenced their drawing near, we will soon start forming trilateral economic committees, and we want to mediate in a positive way as much as possible.

TANJUG: Government Opposes New Zagreb Mayor

LD0401201296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1910 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 4 (TANJUG)—The Croatian Government Thursday proposed to President Franjo Tudjman to withhold his blessing from Goran Granic's election as the new Zagreb mayor.

Granic was elected to the post by majority vote at the inaugural session of the city assembly at the proposal of a coalition of opposition parties that won 65 percent of the vote in the latest local elections.

Granic, who is a member of the opposition Croatian Social-Liberal Party, is also a brother of the high-ranking official of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic.

The HDZ was anxious to keep the post for one of its own members but failed to reach an agreement with the opposition.

According to Croatian law, the president has the right to confirm or reject the election of a particular person to the mayoralty post.

If Granic should fail to receive the green light from Tudjman, a new person will have to be chosen.

Consequently, the possibility of new local elections cannot be ruled out.

However, the opposition believes that it may win an even more convincing victory in possible new elections.

Book on WWII Croatian Figures Sparks Controversy

96P20204A

[FBIS Media Note] The Zagreb weekly GLOBUS, in its 10, 17, and 24 November and 5 December issues, published a 15-page supplement with excerpts of a soon-to-be published book on the lives of important personalities in the NDH (Independent State of Croatia—World War II pro-Nazi state ruled by Ante Pavelic). The book, titled *Who's Who in the NDH*, will present data on 1,000 personalities in the NDH, GLOBUS stated, adding that the excerpts are "the most interesting parts" of a "unique lexicographic work" on which more than 30 historians, writers and journalists collaborated. GLOBUS noted that, with the passage of time, this stormy period of Croatian history is becoming increasingly "opaque." The Independent State of Croatia, its founder and leader Ante Pavelic, and the ustasha (World War II Croatian extremist nationalist) movement on the whole arouse controversy, GLOBUS said. GLOBUS pointed out that the ustasha nation-building plan was, for many Croats, a realization of a thousand-year dream of their own state, although it had been founded under "Nazi fascism and thus received inevitably many of its traits, which, as a curse, have accompanied it up to this day: the liquidation of politically undesirable persons, system of concentration camps, racial laws...." The book's editorial staff rejected the task of passing judgment on the NDH personalities and their controversial historical role, GLOBUS remarked, adding that the writers wanted only to create a handbook in which young people, historians, and publicists could become familiar with numerous names from the NDH.

The 15 December issue of GLOBUS published an interview with the well-known Zagreb intellectual and publicist Slavko Goldstein, in which he criticized GLOBUS for publishing such a supplement. Goldstein stated to GLOBUS that Jews, Serbs, but mostly Croats with whom he spoke, felt that a publication in which Pavelic is popularized and his NDH is rehabilitated is a "disgrace for today's Croatia and is poisoning Croatian youth." He went on to state that he feels that it is his duty to "refute the ugly manipulations of truth," which GLOBUS printed in its four issues, reaching more than one million readers: "Thus, I can now see a page of GLOBUS with the picture of Pavelic glued to the windows of cars and trucks, and it is said that one can see it on various walls, most often next to the picture of Tudjman." He asked: "What do you think would happen to a German newspaper editor if he tried to publicize widely portraits of Hitler in the same way?" Goldstein also objected to the content of the book, saying that it is incorrect since it is a lie: "The lie is not what is

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said but what is not said and what is intentionally and persistently concealed." Goldstein noted that although the editors of the book say in their introduction that they wish to present public life during the NDH, no mention is made of mass murders or of writers and other prominent intellectuals executed by firing squads or hanged in the Zagreb streets. "Isn't that also an integral part of public life?" Goldstein asked. He then gave specific examples, such as the section on the World War II Catholic clergyman Filipovic-Majstorovic which says that he "participated in the slaughter of Serbs in February 1942 in the villages of Drakuiic, Motike and Sargovac near Banja Luka. Because of this incident...he changed his name...and transferred to work in the Ustasha defense...." The word 'slaughter' is used only once in the entire text and is interpreted as an incident, which is an "ugly minimizing of the ugliest crime," Goldstein said.

Goldstein pointed out that under the section on Mile Budak (the writer who held various ministerial positions in the NDH government) all the places are listed where he had delivered his public speeches but there is no mention of the fact that in his speeches he called for ethnic expulsions. Detailed enumerations of newspapers and journals in which he published his literary works are listed, but there is no mention of the racist laws that he had signed and published in the daily HRVATSKI NAROD, Goldstein said, adding that, implementing these laws as a minister of culture and education, Budak expelled all Jews and Serbs from schools, universities and all cultural and public life. There is also no mention of the fact that Budak, as minister of religion, tolerated the murder of literally all Jewish rabbis and the murder and expulsion of almost all Orthodox priests in territory under NDH control, Goldstein stated.

Goldstein also reviewed the sections on concentration camp commanders which make no mention of the fact that under their command mass killing had been committed in these camps. The section on concentration camp commander Maks Luburic describes him as being sent often by Pavelic to Kordun, Lika and Bosnia to carry out special tasks, but it does not detail what kind of tasks these were, Goldstein noted, adding that behind each of these tasks there were hundreds of—maybe a 1,000—dead civilians, something which even Luburic described in his memoirs.

Goldstein also stated that the book does not mention that most Croats did not support the ustasha and their fascist state model. According to NDH statistics, Goldstein remarked, there were only 2,000 organized members of the Ustasha movement in 1941. This is just a handful of extremists, Goldstein notes, adding that this should have been pointed out in the book as proof that Croats did not favor the fascist option, instead of establishing, by omitting this information, a link between present-day Croatia and fascism.

Goldstein called the NDH a criminal state because its basic laws not only tolerated but even promoted crimes: "These were the laws for which, in Nuremberg in 1946, people were hanged and which were regarded as criminal laws by all international conventions. The majority of Croats never wanted or aspired to this kind of a state...."

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Media Said Politicizing 'Legitimate Serb Demands'

LD0401190296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1823 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Jan. 4 (TANJUG)—The public and media in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] unnecessarily politicize legitimate Serb demands for equal rights, a Serb party official said Thursday.

Dragisa Miletic of the Serb Democratic Party in FYROM said that his party had announced in December that, although it basically supported the Dayton agreement, it would ask from Serbia and leading world powers to help resolve the problems of Serbs in Macedonia.

FYROM, unfortunately, saw this move as an alleged threat to the constitutional order, he said.

The Serbs have been demanding for years that the preamble to the FYROM Constitution be changed accordingly to include Serbs and Montenegrins among the ethnic groups living in Macedonia, but our request has remained unanswered, said Miletic.

The constitution specifically mentions Macedonians, ethnic Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies as the ethnic communities living in FYROM.

PDPA, NDP To Remain in FYROM Assembly

AU0301193896 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 3 Jan 96 p 19

[Report by "M.L.": "Parliament Will Not Be Abandoned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Struge, 2 Jan—The parliamentary group of the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians [PDPA] and the People's Democratic Party [NDP] organized an information rally at the hall of the Struge Communal Assembly, attended by members, sympathizers, and our compatriots temporarily employed abroad. The meeting was opened by Deputy Rrahmi Tuda, who is also a coordinator of the first group emanating from these two Albanian parties.

In the beginning of his speech, Tuda stated that, apart from other things, this parliamentary group has been set up to counterbalance the PDP, the party that participates in the executive power. Deputy Rrahmi Tuda then spoke about the Tetovo University and the work and difficulties that this university is currently encountering.

In his speech, Deputy Zeqir Kadriu stated that the deputies of these two parties assess that they should remain in the Assembly of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and that they will commit themselves to resolve the issues of Albanians within the framework of the system's institutions. Meanwhile, Rufi Osmani spoke about the new laws in the customs system, as well as credits and investments in Macedonia.

The deputies then answered the numerous questions of those present in the hall.

Skopje, Tirana Universities To Strengthen Ties

AU0301204296 Skopje MIC in English 3 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Skopje, Mr. Saban Murati was received at the Faculty of Philology in Skopje yesterday.

In the talks with the dean Prof. Dr. Liljana Todorova, ambassador Murati was briefed on the activities of the Faculty, whereby both sides expressed the readiness to strengthen the cooperation between the two faculties, especially in the field of Macedonian language and literature, Albanian language and literature, and other philologies.

In this context, Mr. Murati said he would personally see to the finalization of the initiatives undertaken by both sides, as well as the opening of a Macedonian Department at the University in Tirana, which will turn a new page in the cooperation between the two countries.

Provisions of Draft Law on Geodesy, Cadastre

96BA0051B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 23 Nov 95 p 8

[Article by B. Angelovska: "Cadastre With Legal 'Foundations'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The law covers some 20 basic features, including essential geodesic works, state measurements, cadastre of real estate, underground projects, a basic state map, and a geodesic information system....*

Regulation and underground cadastre, naturally "on paper."

The establishment of a geodesic information system will make possible the overall planning of the area and rational decisionmaking.

Macedonian independence and the changes which occurred in all areas of life made inevitable the need for new urban plans for the Republic as a whole and for individual areas. This must be based on accurate, precise, and substantiated geodesic foundations.

It was precisely for those reasons that recently a draft law on geodesic activities was prepared. It is expected that it will be discussed by the Assembly soon. With this law and with the Law on Cartography, which should

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also be submitted soon, naturally a strong foundation will be created, needed for the formulation of the extensive urban plan of the Republic and urban plans for individual urban, suburban, and rural settlements.

Objectives and Features

The main purpose of the law, as was stressed by Dimitar Dzonov, director of the Republic Geodesic Administration, which drafted a plan, is, naturally, for geodesic activities to find their proper place, above all in area urbanization. The reason is that, so far, some geodesic work was being done in Belgrade and one section was totally neglected and left without any legal regulations, such as that of the underground cadastre. Cartographic work as well is still being done in Belgrade.

The Law on Geodesic Activities covers some 20 basic features. It ratifies basic geodesic works, state measurements of real estate, water, and underground projects, the drafting of the basic state map, topographic maps, a geodesic information system, geodesic metrology, and standards. The measurements are based on an astronomic-geodesic network, which is being drafted on the basis of two systems: the geographic and the Gaus-Kriger. This is followed by trigonometric grids used in identifying and monitoring the horizontal shifting of the terrain caused by earthquakes, and is the base for measurements with which the citizens can obtain title to their land.

Information System

The state measurement lays a base for all grids, both the ones mentioned and the leveling measurements used for the true location of geodesic markers. The main idea is to provide the entire area of the Republic with a complete geodesic base. This means the charting of maps ranging from 1:500 to 1:5000, and over 1:5000.

Another very important aspect is the regulation and underground cadastre. Actually, so far, we do not know the condition of the infrastructure and underground installations, which are a tremendous resource in the urban environmental underground, and which have remained uncontrolled. This regulation will allow us to determine the true condition and to confirm the location of such resources, and will make the accurate determination possible of any fault, director Dzonov explained.

The law includes the cartography of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. One of the basic objectives is the development of a geodesic information system. This means, as Dzonov stressed, that each geodesic section will have a digital model. A geodesic lot is part of the land used and belongs to one of several individuals within the same cadastre township or settlement.

According to Dzonov, this way, all cadastre townships will be digitalized and the data will be entered in a computer. The sublimated results will enable us to establish a geodesic information system that will make possible the overall planning of the area and aid in rational decisionmaking.

The financing of geodesic activities will be provided, as in the past, by the Republic budget and part of the revenue will come from the fees charged for specific services.

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Stanislaw Dobrzanski Named New Defense Minister

LD0501130296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1248 GMT 5 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 5 Jan — Stanislaw Dobrzanski today became the new national defense minister. He received his nomination from President Aleksander Kwasniewski.

The president stressed that all his decisions originated in motions submitted to him by the Government and the coalition, so it would be able, with his assistance, to perform its duties. He added that other speculations about his decisions are pointless as every appointment must "cement the coalition."

Dobrzanski said that his main task as defense minister will be a reconstruction of the legal system, because the present legislation does not create 100 percent conditions for civilian control over the army.

Stanislaw Dobrzanski is 47, a graduate of Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin. Recently he was secretary of the Council of Ministers' Committee for Defense Matters.

Appointees to President's Chancellery Profiled

WS0501111096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by M.J.J., P.W.R., and M.D.Z.: "Kwasniewski's Aides"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Jerzy Milewski, who is 60 years old, is a graduate of the Gdansk University of Technology. Then he received a Ph.D. and the title of honored doctor; he majored in laser science. His scientific career was discontinued in 1980 when he got into politics. He became a member of the Inter-Plant Strike Committee in Gdansk. From July 1982 (he was in the United States when the Martial Law regime was introduced) until 1989 he headed the "Solidarity" office in Brussels; when Lech Walesa was president, between 1991 and 1994 he was the head of the National Security Office [BBN]; at Walesa's recommendation, he was also appointed a deputy minister of national defense.

In the Drawsko conflict, as a deputy minister of defense, he spoke against Walesa. When the president appointed Zbigniew Okonski as head of the ministry, Milewski's position in the ministry weakened, and the new minister demanded his dismissal. In an attempt to stay in the office, Jerzy Milewski had to develop links with Deputy Minister Danuta Waniek of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

Nonetheless, the president finally managed to have Milewski recalled. In this situation SLD politicians dangled ambassadorial prospects in front of him; he was to be appointed ambassador in Portugal or in Denmark. However, Walesa blocked this proposal as well. Milewski was jobless.

Soon after that, he agreed to become an adviser to Aleksander Kwasniewski on defense issues. "I felt honored to receive this proposal," he said. "I am doing this of my own free will, and I am fully aware that Mr. Kwasniewski, regardless of the election result, will remain one of the leading Polish politicians."

Some right-wing politicians provided other explanations for Milewski's decision. Jan Olszewski recalled that the BBN head was on the lists of secret collaborators of the [communist] Security Services as "Franciszek." The lists were prepared by Andrzej Milczanowski and Antoni Macierewicz. Milewski, however, denied that: "The Internal Affairs Ministry only has one file on me; it was started 32 years ago, when some people tried to recruit me. The file also contains my statement, which confirms that they failed."

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski comes from Ciechanow. He was born in 1957, graduated from the Department of Journalism and Scientific Studies at the University of Warsaw. In 1987 he received a Ph.D., presenting a thesis entitled "Conceptions of a Polish Revolution in the Thought of the Polish Communist Party." He joined the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] in 1979, when he was a university student. In 1990 he engaged in an intra-party reformist movement called "The Movement of 8 July." At the "Round Table" he represented the coalition-government side; he was a member of a team for political reforms. He was also a member of the narrow group of the founders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. Later he found himself in its leadership.

Journalists became better familiar with Zbigniew Siemiatkowski when he was the press spokesman of the SLD Club; he assumed this post when he was elected a Sejm deputy in 1991. He also became known as a member of the subcommission which investigated whether or not the Concordat provisions violated the Constitution. The commission decided that the agreement between Poland and the Holy See did not contradict the basic law; such a motion was also backed by Siemiatkowski, who chaired the commission. This triggered considerable dissatisfaction among some of his SLD colleagues, who went even as far as to demand his expulsion from the post of press spokesman.

In the presidential campaign Zbigniew Siemiatkowski was candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski's spokesman

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and one of the most active participants in the campaign. Shortly before the elections he took part in a news conference, where he encouraged journalists to take a closer look at Mieczyslaw Wachowski, who was allegedly residing in the presidential palace in Otwock and running the campaign from there. There were opinions that after the victory such a well-known figure could not be offered a post below head of the BBN. However, things did not turn out that way.

Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has taken an interest in national security issues, particularly issues of internal security, for a long time. He was on the advisory committee of the internal affairs minister; recently he has been elected a member of the commission for special services. In 1993, when the fate of the coalition of SLD and the Polish Peasant Party was uncertain, there was talk that Siemiatkowski was a serious candidate for the post of defense minister.

Andrzej Majkowski graduated from the Geography Department of the University of Warsaw. Later he finished post-graduate studies at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. For many years he was an employee of the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ]. Until 1974 he was the first secretary of the embassy in Moscow; in the years 1974-1975 he was an adviser to the foreign affairs minister; and he was an adviser in the embassy in New Dehli. He was a ministerial adviser in 1978 and 1979 (when Stefan Olszowski was in charge of the ministry); Poland's ambassador to Thailand, Burma, and in the Philippines; he was deputy director of the Department of Asia, Africa, and Australia from 1987 to 1990, and from September 1992 he was director of this department; from February 1995 he was head of the Kurier Polski Publishing House, where most of the shares belonged to PolSat [private television station] owner Zygmunt Solorz. Then he became chairman of the Supervisory Board of the "Lucas" privately-owned group of companies. He intends to give up this post soon.

Majkowski also was a deputy chairman of the Main Administration of the Union of Socialist Youth from 1969 to 1972. He was in the leadership of the Main Committee of Physical Fitness and Tourism and the Polish Tourist and Local Studies Society. He was the head of the Polish Athletic Union. He was a member of the Polish Youth Union, Polish University Student Association, and in 1964 he joined the PZPR.

He has known Aleksander Kwasniewski for many years; they worked together in the Polish Olympic Committee. He looked upon his nomination for the post of an under secretary of state as a return to his profession: "For the greater portion of my life I dealt with foreign policy." Among the priorities of Polish foreign policy, he lists integration with the EU, maintaining the Atlantic course, and developing good relations with neighbors. He would like, however, for Poland to open up to the countries of Asia and the Pacific, which he knows quite well from his work in the MSZ.

"The 21st century will be the time of Asia and the Pacific," he says.

He is 57 years old. He is married and has a daughter.

Andrzej Gliniecki was born in 1948 in Gdansk. In 1973 he graduated from the Department of Law and Administration at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun. Until 1991 he worked as a scientist and a teacher in the department of Administrative Law at the University of Gdansk. In July 1990 he became deputy mayor of the city of Gdansk. He began working in the President's Chancellory in February 1991, where he was appointed director of the Legal Office. Last September he was nominated as an under secretary of state in the President's Chancellory; he was recalled on 31 December 1995 at his own request.

"I looked upon my work as service for the state. We dealt with the law. Political decisions were made elsewhere. During the previous presidency, we managed to stay non-political, and I hope that this will not change in the future," replied Gliniecki when asked why he had decided to cooperate with Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Krzysztof Janik was born in 1950 in Kielce. In 1971 he graduated from the Law Department at the Jagiellonian University, and five years later he obtained a Ph.D. in political science. In the 1970's he began his career in the party. In 1968 he joined the PZPR. In the years 1971 to 1975 he was the first secretary and the deputy chairman of the Voivodship administration of the Rural Youth Union in Krakow; in 1976 he became a member of the Union of Socialist Polish Youth, where from 1981 to 1986 he was the first secretary and then first deputy chairman of the Main Administration. Until 1990 he was head of a section [not further identified] and head of a section dealing with the intelligentsia [zespol inteligencji] of the PZPR Central Committee. In SdRP he was elected a member of the Central Executive Committee of the party.

He has been a Sejm deputy since 1993. In the Sejm he specialized in issues of territorial self-government; he became known in the self-government elections in 1994, when he proposed that Aleksander Kwasniewski be appointed mayor of Warsaw. Later, during Kwasniewski's presidential campaign, he said in an interview with GAZETA WYBORCZA that his party was a better defender of the ideals of the August 1980 than Marian Krzaklewski's "Solidarity." He was one of the leading

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figures of the leftist candidate's campaign staff; he was responsible for Kwasniewski's platform.

Szymon Tadeusz Kociszewski was born in 1930. In 1967 he graduated from the Main School of Planning and Statistics. The President's Chancellory, in his official biography, provides information that between 1947 and 1954 he was "an employee of various state-owned and cooperative companies." In the years 1954 to 1968 he worked in the Ministry of Forestry and Wood Industry. In the late 1960's he was deputy director for economic issues in the Warsaw Wood Products Company "Las." In 1970 he began working in the Chancellory of the State Council and the Sejm; between 1982 and 1989 he headed the Financial Office there. In July 1989 he was appointed director of the Financial Office in the President's Chancellory. In November 1993 he was nominated as an under secretary of state. Last March he was appointed deputy head of the President's Chancellory.

Former Minister Interviewed on Oleksy Case

LD0401130096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0635 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] There are still more and more questions concerning Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, who is suspected of collaboration with a foreign intelligence service. What evidence is there? Were telephone conversations bugged? Why on 19 December exactly did the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] send documents to the Military Prosecutor's Office?

Andrzej Milczanowski [former interior minister] has agreed to answer some of these questions exclusively with Malgorzata Slomkowska, correspondent for the "Signals of the Day" program.

[Begin recording] [Slomkowska] Could you not have submitted the motion to the prosecutor's office earlier — a month or two months before the election campaign had started?

[Milczanowski] Before, well, it was not quite possible from a technical point of view.

[Slomkowska] You simply did not have all the documents?

[Milczanowski] You are right to a great extent.

[Slomkowska] You said yesterday that if you still were the minister of internal affairs you would not have done it then, that you would have continued to gather documents.

[Milczanowski] I only said that I would have continued to deal with the case in an operational stage. This means that it would not have been sent yet to the prosecuting bodies.

[Slomkowska] For how long?

[Milczanowski] It is difficult to say. It could be months, for example.

[Slomkowska] Why you did not want to show Prime Minister Oleksy his files?

[Milczanowski] Let us distinguish two moments here. First, in February or March 1995 — there were no conditions then nor any documents that could have led to the refusal. The second moment came when the prime minister asked me [for the files] in December; then the reasons were obvious. You do not show documents to a person involved. In my view, it would be against the law and contrary to any rules concerning pending proceedings.

[Slomkowska] When did the crucial moment come when you were almost certain that Prime Minister Oleksy was a suspect?

[Milczanowski] Regarding a justified suspicion of an offense being committed, it was in 1995, after he became prime minister.

[Slomkowska] Tell me, what can one spy on nowadays; what secrets can be betrayed?

[Milczanowski] There are many more than you and many other people can think of. Of course, I treat this question quite apart from a specific situation.

[Slomkowska] Yes, I am talking about hypothetical situations.

[Milczanowski] Well, one can provide information from various spheres of life — political, economic, military. But I want to stress once again that I treat your question as a hypothetical one, with no connection with this particular case. All the more important actions by authorities, intentions and plans, for example, in the economic field or as regards political moves, they all constitute very important information, very important indeed.

[Slomkowska] Can you say what sort of evidence you have collected in the case? Are there photographs or tapes?

[Milczanowski] No, I cannot say anything on this matter.

[Slomkowska] Were the telephones of first speaker Oleksy, and then Prime Minister Oleksy bugged?

[Milczanowski] No, I strongly deny this.

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[Slomkowska] So there were no bugs installed in the apartment and the offices?

[Milczanowski] No, there were not. I can assure you that the evidence is not based on this, so this could not have happened.

[Milczanowski] What about people associated with Prime Minister Oleksy? Were they your informers?

[Slomkowska] You know, one cannot speculate here as it is impossible to answer a question based on speculation.

[Milczanowski] There was information that the Government Protection Office [BOR] had been your men, at least some of them.

[Slomkowska] I strongly deny that the BOR was involved in gathering any information in this case.

[Slomkowska] The press speculated that the evidence you had was bought and was fabricated. I have heard that it was done, among other people, by Marian Zacharski [adviser to the State Protection Office head].

[Milczanowski] I strongly deny the censure, moreover the insinuation, that the documents were allegedly fabricated and the case was an alleged manipulation of political provocation. I want to deny it in the strongest possible way.

[Slomkowska] Vladimir Alganov, former KGB resident in Poland, said at a news conference that he had had a meeting with Marian Zacharski and that he had recorded the conversation. Zacharski is alleged to have said that one has to prevent the return of communists in Poland. Does the tape really exist and did you know about the meeting between Zacharski and Alganov?

[Milczanowski] I can only say that I knew about the meeting between Zacharski and Alganov. As regards the content of the meeting, I do not want to discuss it, but I can most strongly deny that any political discussion took place during this meeting. This is simply not true.

[Slomkowska] Have you got a tape, a recording of this conversation?

[Milczanowski] No comment.

[Slomkowska] Alganov also said that he could provide the tape to the Extraordinary Sejm Commission. Did the Commission talk to you about it?

[Milczanowski] All my statements before the Commission are secret.

[Slomkowska] Why has this case seen the light of day? Couldn't one send the documents to the prosecutor's office and wait?

[Milczanowski] It was not me who decided to convene the meeting on 19 December at 2100 at the Presidential Palace. I was one of the participants.

[Slomkowska] But the documents were leaked to the media one way or another.

[Milczanowski] Indeed, indeed. There was different information and different speculations on the subject, including some that was imaginary and revealed unlawfully.

[Slomkowska] Who do you think could be a source of the leak?

[Milczanowski] I cannot think, I cannot think and I cannot speculate.

[Slomkowska] Is it true that during a meeting between you and the minister of foreign affairs with the then president elect you said: If Prime Minister Oleksy withdraws, there will be no case.

[Milczanowski] There was no blackmail whatsoever.

[Slomkowska] And what was?

[Milczanowski] This conversation must also be kept secret, but of course it is going to be revealed before the Commission and the prosecutor's office if need be.

[Slomkowska] But was it the case that if Oleksy resigned there would be no case? You did not suggest this, did you?

[Milczanowski] No comments. [preceding sentence in English]

[Slomkowska] Do you think that the case can be honestly clarified today?

[Milczanowski] It should be. But can it? Time will tell.

[Slomkowska] How do you feel now?

[Milczanowski] Normal.

[Slomkowska] Do you feel that you have done your duty?

[Milczanowski] Only this. As far as the case is concerned, I am talking about it without even a shade of satisfaction. This was extremely difficult and extremely hard duty and I had no other option. I simply had no other option than to deal with this the way I did.

[Slomkowska] Thank you, minister.

[Milczanowski] Thank you, but not minister anymore. [end recording]

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Sejm Commission Holds Hearings in Oleksy Case

WS0401152396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by "JACH,KES": "Behind the Commission's Closed Doors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Milczanowski versus Oleksy at the Sejm. "There was a danger that the new heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] would quash the Oleksy case," Andrzej Milczanowski has told GAZETA WYBORCZA. That is why he decided to reveal the affair, although he did not conclude the investigations.*

A special Sejm commission interviewed Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski, former Deputy Interior Minister General Henryk Jasik, who was dismissed a week ago, and head of the Office of State Protection General Gromoslaw Czempinski behind closed doors yesterday.

The commission members asked Milczanowski and Oleksy mainly about the issues they raised in their Sejm addresses. According to our sources, Oleksy repeated the opinion that Lech Walesa — embittered about having lost the presidential elections — staged a political plot.

Czempinski told us that some of the commission members tried to be sarcastic with him, but they soon backed down, "realizing the professionalism of the Polish secret services."

"If it were possible, I would have waited on revealing the Oleksy case and continued operational procedures," Andrzej Milczanowski told us immediately after the hearing. That would have taken at least several months more.

Milczanowski also told us that suspicions about the dual identity of Oleksy arose only after he had already taken over as the head of the cabinet. Prior to that, he was never suspected of collaborating with the Russian intelligence services.

Neither were there any suspicions in September 1994, when UOP head General Czempinski warned him against further contacts with KGB Colonel Vladimir Alganov who was a staff officer of Russian intelligence. Czempinski even went on to add in good faith at the time: "You are probably not aware of that."

Milczanowski stressed that at the news conference held in Moscow on Tuesday [2 January], Alganov said he met Oleksy in 1981, whereas the MSW thought they had known each other since 1983.

Prime Minister Oleksy confirmed yesterday that he knew Algnov very well. "He was my neighbor, a young diplomat." He went on to say he did not see anything unusual about that, adding that he last saw Alganov in the summer of 1994.

The prime minister criticized Moscow for attempting to defend him against espionage charges with the aid of former KGB agents. "Foreign authorities passing judgments on Poland and Polish politicians are not doing our country any good. All this is harming Poland," said Jozef Oleksy.

Commenting on the news conference Alganov held in Moscow, the UOP head said: "The Russians obviously could not stand the tension." Recently dismissed Deputy Interior Minister General Henryk Jasik firmly denied that the charges against Oleksy are a provocation staged by the Soviet services. He also denied the possibility that the affair might have been staged by the Polish secret services.

Testimony Implicates Oleksy

WS0501134396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5 Jan 96 p 1

[Report by Jerzy Jachowicz and Pawel Wronski: "From Alganov to Oleksy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The testimony of high-ranking officers of the Office of State Protection [UOP] confirms the statements made by [former Interior] Minister Milczanowski on 21 December at the Sejm on Prime Minister Oleksy's contacts with a foreign intelligence service, we learned yesterday from several members from the special Sejm commission.*

"The hypothesis that the Oleksy affair is a provocation is confirmed neither by the materials that Andrzej Milczanowski submitted to the military prosecutor's office nor by the testimony of high-ranking UOP officers," said Ryszard Bugaj of the Union of Labor after yesterday's closed session. Jerzy Ciemniewski of the Freedom Union shared Bugaj's opinion. He added that the findings of the commission up to now indicate that the secret services had operated legitimately. The commission is examining whether the UOP violated the law in the process of collecting information on Oleksy's contacts with a foreign intelligence service.

According to two commission members (both representing the opposition) who asked to remain anonymous, after two days of hearings the commission has confirmed Milczanowski's reports. Among others, the fact that Oleksy passed on oral and written reports as well as classified documents — such as a UOP report on the dangers posed by residents of foreign intelligence services — to Alganov and another officer of the Russian

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intelligence services. Another member of the commission claims that the materials include a recorded conversation between Oleksy and Alganov, obtained by tapping the latter's phone.

"Polish intelligence never surveilled the prime minister alone. The information about his contacts with foreign intelligence was obtained in the course of operations, that is, the surveillance of a resident of a foreign intelligence service," said General Wiktor Fonfara, head of the Investigation Board at UOP, after having been interviewed by the commission. "Next week," he added, "the UOP will submit additional materials to the Supreme Military Prosecutor's Office. These documents are unquestionable."

Fonfara told the commission — as we unofficially learned — that his only fear at the time the Ministry of Internal Affairs was submitting the materials to the prosecutor's office was that Polish agents in the east might be unmasked. Asked whether Alganov was the only KGB agent Oleksy contacted, Fonfara said that the prime minister contacted "many people."

Former head of counterintelligence Colonel Konstanty Miodowicz told reporters that newly appointed Interior Minister Jerzy Konieczny did not tell the truth when he said on Wednesday [3 January] that the UOP had not carried out any operations in Oleksy's case. Milczanowski also spoke about this yesterday: "There are many kinds of covert operational methods: tapping phones, observation, reading mail, rounding up agents." The former interior minister let it be known that in the case of Oleksy, the last method was applied. We unofficially learned that counterintelligence services had "worked" on Alganov for a long time. At the end of June and the beginning of July 1995 the first evidence that Oleksy was collaborating with the Russian intelligence services was obtained.

Apart from Milczanowski, Fonfara, and Miodowicz, the commission also interviewed head of intelligence General Bogdan Libera and the UOP head's adviser, General Marian Zacharski. After the hearing, Zacharski told reporters that Alganov "told the truth only at one point": It is indeed true that they met in Majorca. The former KGB agent accused Zacharski on Wednesday of having mounted a provocation "against the new political forces in Poland." Zacharski allegedly confessed doing so to Alganov at Majorca.

Head of Counterintelligence Service Resigns

LD0401124196 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1227 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Jan — After being questioned by the extraordinary Sejm Commission investigating the legality of the Interior Ministry's actions in Jozef Oleksy's case, Konstanty Miodowicz told journalists today that on 2 January he had ceased to be the State Protection Office [UOP] counterintelligence chief at his own request and that he had left UOP altogether.

At 1300 hours [1200 GMT] the Commission began questioning Bogdan Libera, UOP's chief of intelligence, who refused to talk to waiting journalists.

Former Intelligence Officer Offers Open Letter

WS0501113196 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 3 Jan 96 p 2

[Henryk Bosak's "Open Letter to Officers of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Officers of the Office of State Protection, Including Gromek [diminutive for Gromoslaw] Czempinski and Bogdan Libera, My Friends and Colleagues at the First Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs!"; date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] DEAR COLLEAGUES!

Officers of the Polish intelligence and counterintelligence services have always honorably served Poland and the raison d'etat. That is why retired officers are not ashamed of their past. On the contrary, I am very proud of my career in the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Polish Peoples Republic [PRL]. I served a real Poland, the only one that existed and was internationally recognized.

The history of intelligence and counterintelligence, however, does not end on 1990, the year when the First [as published] and Second departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] were dissolved. The majority of the young cadres went on to work for the Office of State Protection [UOP]. Whether you like it or not, we have a lot in common: the past, joint operations, archive materials and plain friendship. That is why I was hurt and ashamed to learn that you played a part in staging the political provocation of accusing Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy of collaborating with the KGB as an agent.

DEAR COLLEAGUES!

COULD IT BE YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN WHAT YOU WERE TAUGHT AT THE OKKW [expansion unknown], NAMELY THAT ONE OF THE FOLLOWING HAVE TO BE OBTAINED BEFORE CLAIMS OF INTELLIGENCE LINKS WITH A FIELD AGENT ARE RAISED: A COMMITMENT TO COOPERATE, A HANDWRITTEN REPORT, OR A RECEIPT CONFIRMING PAYMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SIGNED WITH A PSEUDONYM? Sometimes only one these may have existed, but the field agent

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always had to be aware he was cooperating with an intelligence service. That awareness was always proved by secret contacts and covert communication channels. The above rules were observed in all the intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact, especially in the KGB. Has the UOP thus obtained Jozef Oleksy's commitment to cooperate with the KGB? Does it have any copies of his reports or receipts confirming he was paid for intelligence services? Does it have proof that his contacts with Russian diplomats were clandestine and the methods of passing on information covert? If there is no such proof, those responsible for charging Jozef Oleksy with state treason should apologize as soon as possible and confess they were manipulated by the heads of the MSW.

Jozef Oleksy's statement indicates that he maintained official and private contacts with many diplomats, among them Russians. Contacts between politicians and diplomats are a normal practice of everyday political life. As the well-informed ZYCIE WARSZAWY reported (some claim it was fed information by the UOP), the materials incriminating Oleksy are a registered KGB file containing his pseudonym. Let us assume the documents are authentic. So what? COULD IT BE THAT YOU HAVE FORGOTTEN, MY DEAR COLLEAGUES, THAT INFORMATIONAL CONTACTS ARE A FORM OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS?

I worked on the socialist states front for 12 years (from 1972-1982, resident in Belgrade; from 1982-1985, head of the XI Department which dealt with socialist states; from 1985-1990, resident in Budapest). I frequently met with representatives of the then allied intelligence services of the Warsaw Pact countries, the KGB included. I thus consider myself an expert on the methods and practices applied by the intelligence services of former socialist states. After 1968 and the developments in the Czechoslovakia, the intelligence services of the socialist states surveilled each other. The main objective of intelligence activities was collecting information on alliances and discords among party leaders, emerging factions, and the strength and significance of anti-government opposition movements. The governments of the allied states did not share that information; on the contrary, it was a closely guarded secret. As, however, the intelligence services of the Warsaw pact countries did not round up agents from the allied states, RECONNAISSANCE WAS CARRIED OUT BY CHANNELS OTHER THAN VIA AGENTS. Non-agent intelligence consisted of close contacts maintained by diplomats-cum-intelligence officers with politicians, higher state officials, members of the Central Committee [of the Polish United Workers Party], officers of the MSW and the Ministry of National Defense [MON], and getting information from them. Files were kept on these contacts, otherwise referred to as information sources. THE XI DEPARTMENT KEPT MANY FILES ON INFORMATION CONTACTS FOR CITIZENS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. NATURALLY, NONE OF THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SOURCES KNEW THERE WAS A FILE ON HIM AT THE FIRST DEPARTMENT, COMPLETE WITH PSEUDONYM AND A DOSSIER. Jozef Oleksy similarly did not know the KGB kept a file on him. I am sure that many Polish politicians, diplomats, MSW and MON officers still have dossiers in the archives of former Warsaw Pact states, jut like similar files on their citizens are kept in the UOP archives. SEVERAL THOUSAND FILES ON INFORMATION CONTACTS WERE KEPT BY THE FIRST DEPARTMENT, SOME OF THEM ON NATO STATE CITIZENS, A FEW HUNDRED OF WHICH I PERSONALLY COMPILED. AMONG THEM WERE THREE AMBASSADORS (ONE OF THEM AMERICAN), TWO NUNCIOS, OVER A DOZEN TRADE COUNSELORS AND CONSULS, A FEW DOZEN JOURNALISTS AND NATO INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. Each one of them could be accused of collaborating with PRL intelligence services, just like Prime Minister Oleksy is currently being charged. Charges could just as well be brought against politicians who emerged from the opposition movements. NATO INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ALSO KEPT DOSSIERS ON INFORMATION CONTACTS. AFTER 1982, BRONISLAW GEREMEK, JANUSZ ONYSZKIEWICZ, TADEUSZ MAZOWIECKI AND MANY OTHER DISSIDENTS OF THE TIME WERE FREQUENT GUESTS AT WESTERN EMBASSIES. DO YOU THINK, MY DEAR COLLEAGUES, THAT WHEN THE POLISH OPPOSITIONISTS MET WITH WESTERN DIPLOMATS-CUM-INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS THEY TALKED ABOUT BOOKS AND WOMEN? Yet none of the Polish dissidents was charged by the PRL'S MSW with espionage or state treason.

DEAR COLLEAGUES!

Accusing someone of collaborating with a foreign intelligence service without proving actual links with any agency is absurd and leads to paranoia. I am aware that you have worked under extremely difficult conditions over the last five years. You were forced to prove your loyalty to superiors appointed by Lech Walesa. But those times are over. I trust that from now on UOP officers will be evaluated on the basis of their performance, and not where they came from. It is high time to take a serious look at how the UOP works, at how the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic and

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leftist activists are being handled. Could it be you do not see the connection between the charges that have been raised against Jozef Oleksy and the former president's threats that he will "break the left's back" or "wring its neck"? Could it be you are unaware of the B-plan designed to "prolong the rule" of Lech Walesa and his ministers?

COLLEAGUES!

A sovereign and democratic Poland needs efficient secret services to serve the raison d'etat, and not just one political option. Set yourselves free of the burden that the former president's ministers have put on your shoulders. Muster the courage to do it! I wish you succeed in the new year of 1996.

P.S. This letter is not addressed to Henryk Jasik, despite the fact that he was often my guest in Budapest. In 1990, to win Minister Andrzej Milczanowski's favors, he disclosed information a dignified intelligence officer never reveals. He is not even worth shaking hands with.

Yours, Henryk Bosak (former officer of the First Department in the years 1953-1996, verified by the inhabitants of Warsaw when he was elected councilman for the Warsaw Center district).

Article Analyzes Polish NATO Membership

96EP0012A Poznan WPROST in Polish 5 Nov 95 No 45, p 8

[Article by Henryk Szlajfer, professor at the European Center for Research on Security in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, published under the rubric "Weather Forecast": "A Pact With the Pact"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is difficult to answer the question of what should be done for the leaders of NATO countries to acknowledge the need to invite Poland to join the alliance. It is much easier to say what should not be done.

The principal problem is precisely to determine whether the security interests of Poland and the NATO countries converge at some point or points. Unless such convergence exists, there is no rationale for our "joining the club." I do believe that it exists, but it should be defined without referring to our very narrowly conceived interests or even, God forbid, phobias. The claim that Poland wants to be in NATO because, e.g., it fears Russia or some other country, is not an acceptable argument. In other words, our membership in NATO can result solely from principled reflection on the role of that alliance in present-day Europe and its future and more precise definition of the premises for the so-called grand strategy of the West.

Seen from this standpoint, paradoxical as it may seem, there do not and cannot exist any specifically Polish (Czech, etc.) arguments in favor of broadening NATO. And there is no point in wasting time on more or less successful attempts to devise any such arguments as our principal "weapon" in the struggle for membership in the alliance. It is much more worthwhile to pay attention to joining the broad debate on the shape of European security and the future of NATO, to point up the relationships existing between our presence in the alliance and the interests of the United States and Western Europe. In a word, geopolitics and geostrategy, security interests, and specific terms for participation—such are the arguments which should be promoted much more energetically.

But (security) interests are not everything. In the present-day world what also counts are such values as democracy, the market, cultural identity. And here we face difficult issues. The "Poland-NATO" report points to certain domestic conditions which need to be met in order to promote our attempts to gain membership in NATO. It also points to obstacles. I believe that these issues should be paid much more attention.

What counts is not only the issue of Poland's economic-military potential and strategic position (here we stand on quite solid ground). What also matters is the credibility of our leading political elites, the predictability of their behavior, the genuineness of their attachment to the ideas they proclaim. If these elites behave ambiguously (especially as regards Polish-Russian relations), we should not be surprised that our partners in the West weigh all pros and cons very carefully. Unless the Divine Spirit (to refer again to the Supreme Authority) enlightens these elites and restrains them from committing follies, I fear that it is we ourselves who will erect the principal barriers on the road to NATO.

The most important problem nowadays: The trump card of our politicians and diplomacy in their discussions with NATO so far has been and is the virtually nationwide consensus on Poland's future membership in NATO, but unfortunately that consensus is being discreetly undermined. If windy debates break out when action is needed, if issues which were already decided are raised again, we are dealing, to put it mildly, with an absence of memory, experience, professionalism, and feeling.

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Report on Condition of Environment Detailed

WS0401131096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Nauka i Technika supplement) in Polish 20 Dec 95 p II

[Report by Krystyna Forowicz: "Areas of Hazard; Playing With the Ecological Pieces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Out of more than 300 towns and gminas [smallest administrative units] which ecologists have marked on maps as black spots, 114 places still remain as black spots. Currently 16 voivodships are considered clean, although in the past they were classified as polluted. Until recently they had the label of "areas of ecological hazard." However, sufficient documents have been gathered on new regions with degraded environment, such as Zielona Gora Voivodship. Areas considered to be "ecologically threatened" — 10 years ago there were 27 of them — need verifying, and the data collected years ago need to be updated.*

The condition of the environment has improved quite considerably. We have witnessed development of new production technologies and new methods of using natural resources. Research techniques have changed and there has been an evolution of scientific views, claim experts of the Main Inspectorate of Environmental Protection [GIOS]. They have drawn up a report entitled "Classification of Gminas According to Environmental Hazard Incidence (Verification of Ecologically Threatened Areas)."

The criteria of classification of gminas were prepared by a team of the National Foundation of Environment Protection, with the help of a GIOS Monitoring Team.

It Is Known Which Areas Are the Cleanest

Among the 2,444 gminas, more than half were included in the A group, which means that in those areas there are no environmental hazards (or they are insignificant); and due to the very good condition of the environment, so far there has been no need to carry out more detailed research or make more measurements in those areas. Furthermore, 752 towns and gminas (31 percent) were included in the B category — lack of above-normal pollution. More than 15 percent — 361 gminas — constitute the C group, which means that in those gminas polluted areas exist, but due to lack of sufficient data the scope and intensity of this pollution cannot be specified. The C group includes such places as Czeladz, Swietochlowice, as well as such towns as Bedzin, Jaworzno, Katowice, Piekary Slaskie, Slawkow, Sosnowiec, and Walbrzych.

In 82 gminas (3 percent — D group) the natural environment is definitely degraded; the norms of noxious substances concentration are always exceeded. This group has for years invariably been represented by such towns as Bytom and Kedzierzyn Kozle.

The situation in such regions of environmental hazard as Upper Silesia, the Rybnik area, and the Mystkow and Zawiercie area has only slightly improved. Far greater changes have taken place in other regions — in such voivodships as Legnica, Tarnobrzeg, Lodz, Walbrzych, Opole, and Wloclawek. However, in these regions there are still relatively large areas — sometimes they include several gminas — which are threatened by above-normal pollution of the environment.

According to the new criteria, there has been an improvement in the situation of the Konin, Szczecin, and Krakow voivodships, regions which used to be classified as areas of ecological disaster (such a term also exists). In Konin Voivodship there are only four gminas which disturb voivodship inspectors of environmental protection. In Szczecin Voivodship there are only three (there were 16 in the past), and in Krakow Voivodship there are only two such gminas (27 in the past).

Zielona Gora Voivodship No Longer Green

Sixteen areas of environmental hazard were removed from the map of Poland. These are the following areas: Gdansk, Chelm, Pulawy, Poznan, Jelenia Gora, and Inowroclaw. In the case of the Bydgoszcz and Torun region, only one town still remains on the map; the same goes for Czestochowa, Tarnow, Kielce — Biale Zaglebie, Poznan, and Wroclaw — in all these areas there is one town; also, there is one gmina in the Turoszow area.

Sufficient data was collected on environmental hazards on large areas of Zielona Gora Voivodship. The areas where above-normal pollution was detected include 10 gminas, mostly in the border regions. Environmental protection inspectors believe that the condition of the natural environment in Zielona Gora Voivodship needs to be further analyzed, because there are no big sources of pollution there. Most of the pollution is of an "inflow," trans-border character.

The reason for environmental degradation in several towns in the Warsaw and Skierniewice voivodships is entirely different. Most of the pollution sources are of a local nature there; only seldom are they regional. In line with unofficial opinions, Warsaw Voivodship should have been classified as an area of environmental hazard a long time ago.

More Than 10 Years Have Passed

In 1985 work on the "General Diagnosis of Environmental Protection in Poland" was completed. This document, prepared by Andrzej Kassenberg and Czeslaw

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Rolewicz, was the first to classify some parts of Poland as "areas of ecological hazard."

As many as 27 such regions were singled out; they included over 300 towns and gminas, which covered 11 percent of Poland's area and which were inhabited by approximately 35 percent of its population.

The authors of the "General Diagnosis..." argued then that in those areas "the natural balance was completely upset, which manifested itself in the loss of resistance, elimination of self-purification and regeneration processes in biological systems, as well as in the increased hazard to health and higher incidence of diseases determined by the condition of the environment" (Kassenberg, Rolewicz 1985).

"These criteria are so general and, in fact, noncartographical that it is impossible to distinguish any specific territory on their basis," say the authors of the report, specialists of the GIOS Monitoring Team.

On the other hand, the former 27 ecological hazard areas, regions with degraded environment, or whatever they are called, are still the source of 73 percent of dust emission in Poland, 80 percent of gas emissions, and over 60 percent of sewage that requires purification. In those areas there are 80 percent of the most polluted tree stands and 90 percent of the industrial refuse which has accumulated so far.

"Every five years the assessment of the environment condition will be subject to verification; every year all voivodship inspectors will classify individual elements of the environment," Dr. Adam Mierzwinski, under secretary of state in the Environmental Protection Ministry, said at the first session of the National Council of Environmental Protection on 11 December.

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Drnovsek Interviewed on Political, Economic Issues

AU0401202696 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 Dec 95 pp 31-32

[Interview with Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Janko Lorenci; place and date not given: "We Are Not on a Dead End Street. We Did Not Miss Anything. And We Have Steady Nerves."]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Lorenci] The Slovene political year of 1995 was marked by problems in the coalition, where crisis has become permanent, a way of life. Does this considerably diminish Slovenia's political stability?

[Drnovsek] No. Deep down, any coalition is difficult. It is normal that major crises also occur, that there is a fuss. Despite this, the coalition continues to resolve the most pressing matters, for example the budget. This means that the country functions and that its stability is not threatened.

[Lorenci] The agreement about the budget, therefore, confirms that the coalition still makes sense?

[Drnovsek] For the time being, the budget's passage is the most important task for the coming year. This does not mean that some coalition parties will cease to flaunt their differences and different interests. Difficulties can still happen. Had we failed to agree on the budget, however, the coalition would have disintegrated already.

[Lorenci] So, you presented them the choice—either or?

[Drnovsek] That is correct. We are also working on an alternative variant, namely, to secure a majority in parliament regardless of the coalition.

[Lorenci] Did you seriously consider a sort of technical government whereby the coalition agreements would be broken and you would negotiate with the ministers individually?

[Drnovsek] It cannot be discounted if such tensions continue within the coalition. Then we would opt for a minority government of the LDS [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia] in combination with some independent ministers and on the basis of support secured in parliament. The minimal majority in the parliament is necessary and can be obtained even without a coalition agreement.

[Lorenci] The situation is, nevertheless, unusual and also a little ridiculous. Peterle [president of the Christian Democratic Party] says that the coalition has run its course but that the Christian Democrats can only leave if you chuck them out. Have you ever been tempted?

[Drnovsek] Faced with such and similar statements, the temptation is truly great. To work in the coalition and at the same time behave like the most hardened opposition is not serious. This cannot last for long.

[Lorenci] The Christian Democratic Party [SKD] is suffering the biggest damage from this anyway.

[Drnovsek] I also think so. The voters do not perceive this as serious and responsible behavior. In such crises in the coalition, I try to react as little as possible and wait until the crisis is over. However, everything has its limits.

[Lorenci] Peterle criticizes you for some things that appear to merit consideration. Among other things he says that you do not tell his party about important matters, that you do not control your own party, and that, for that reason, you are an unreliable partner. Do you accept a portion of the blame?

[Drnovsek] No. Peterle has been tormented by such problems ever since his resignation over the Aquileia dispute. Since he is no longer in the government, the conflicts have followed one after another. Evidently he wants to be in the game all the time and decide about certain matters on which the government decides. For this, he has four ministers in the government who are supposed to do so and also represent the SKD. Even in the times when Peterle was still satisfied with the work of the coalition, we did not function very differently. The presidents of the coalition parties meet occasionally to exchange opinions on major issues. Otherwise, we communicate among ourselves via party secretaries and also in the ad hoc coalition groups. The coordination among the heads of the clubs of deputies in the parliament is also supposed to function. In brief, there are numerous mechanisms that sometimes work better and sometimes worse. The coordination of the party presidents cannot be an incarnation of the former Communist party coordination or the coordination of the Socialist Alliance, which would decide about everything, including cadre matters, replace all other institutions, and issue directives left, right, and center. However, it is true that certain things in the functioning of the coalition could be defined more firmly. Sometimes this suits Mr. Peterle and sometimes not. It is utopian to expect strict discipline in such a heterogeneous coalition. A merciless disciplining of everybody, including deputies, on any, even the most trivial of matters, is also nonsensical. First, this is difficult to accomplish and, second, it is impossible to reduce the deputies to pawns that merely press buttons. On the agreed key points, they must, of course, toe the line. However, to insist on unreserved discipline within a party and then within the coalition would be counterproductive.

[Lorenci] Your LDS is considered to be the least disciplined of all parties.

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[Drnovsek] I would not say so. When push comes to shove, the LDS is always "disciplined," that is, capable of self-control. However, it is true that, as a big party, it is also heterogeneous. It includes a lot more independent people and intellectuals than other parties. This is an advantage, but, in terms of "discipline," it is sometimes also a weakness. The present coalition is specific also in this respect. As a matter of rule, the ruling parties become more disciplined if the political scene is divided into two clear blocks that are in stark confrontation. It seldom happens that anyone from the ruling party would deviate and vote for the opposition or vice versa. We do not have such a black and white division and, for that reason, this type of discipline is either not necessary or is more difficult to achieve.

[Lorenci] Will relations with the [Catholic] Church be strained further because of the passage of the law on the moratorium on restitution of forests?

[Drnovsek] Perhaps, however, they could hardly become any worse than they have been recently. The church started meddling in political and secular life very aggressively. My impression is that it believes it should fill a sort of a void and, in a way, gain control in this type of country (in transition). This, of course, is very wrong. The church's political aggressiveness is also preventing a normal dialogue on questions that concern it specifically and that should be resolved adequately also to its benefit or with its cooperation. A partnership cooperation in the matters that concern the church is desirable; however, clericalism on the Slovene political scene is impermissible.

[Lorenci] It, therefore, seems to you that the church is extending itself beyond the limits normal for mature democracies?

[Drnovsek] Exactly. The church started to openly support some parties and political options. It is said that they even have permanent meetings, at which they coordinate with each other, issue directions, and so forth. One can call this a blatant infringement on daily politics. It absolutely exceeds all limits.

[Lorenci] This offensive can turn against the church. The church has obviously set itself clear priorities and is now trying, also because of bad experiences in the past, to acquire tangible levers of power, assets, political influence, and so forth. To accomplish this, it is even willing to lose the trust of the citizens and its congregation. It behaves as if a forest in a hand would be more important to it then a soul on the roof.

[Drnovsek] I could concur with this. Although there are many Catholics among the Slovenes. I believe they no longer accept such a role for the church, that is, the clericalism. Earlier, the Slovenes did not like the Church being pushed to the margin too much, but they do not like the other extreme either. I believe that if the church tries to grow from its pastoral and religious role into a political factor that meddles in all spheres of life, this will cause a revolt and will not help the church either.

[Lorenci] Do you continue to dismiss early elections?

[Drnovsek] The regular elections will take place in a year's time at the latest. Talking about early elections in the electoral year is not very profound. In order to hold early elections, the government would have to resign, its prime minister would have to resign, we would have to agree that we cannot elect a new government, and so on. In short, we would have to artificially create a crisis that does not exist. Why should we signal to ourselves and to the world, unduly, that there is a crisis and instability here when, in reality, there is none? Evidently, somebody would like to generate crises artificially, but he does not have sufficient support and a majority for it. The initiative, therefore, does not have great chances of success.

[Lorenci] You are renowned as a pragmatist, and if a clear signal indicated that early elections were better, you would probably agree to them. When you emphasize that elections must take place at the regular time, you are playing the card of stability, predictability, reliability, and everything that you and your government are supposed to personify. At the same time, you are probably an optimist regarding the developments in the coming year. However, are you not afraid that, in the time leading up to the regular elections—there is a full year to go—the economic situation might deteriorate, there could be affairs, or something similar could befall you?

[Drnovsek] A big question is what early elections can solve. The Austrian example is very graphic: One loses a couple of months and then almost identical political relations are established. This could also happen here. This is first. Second, economic trends by no means warrant alarm and such a critical move. They are mostly very positive. The world is increasingly acknowledging this, and Slovenia is becoming the epitome of economic and political stability and by no means of instability and crisis, which early elections would imply in a way. If we could not agree on the budget, this would already be a reason for crisis behavior. However, as it seems, we will succeed in agreeing on the reduced budget, the unburdening of the economy, and its greater competitiveness. This is the most that we can achieve in the present circumstances in a country such as this one. We would have to do this in any case, even if we decided for early elections. Affairs? They happen all the

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time, they are always possible. Affairs cannot decide about early elections, at least I am not one to preoccupy myself with plotting affairs. Perhaps somebody else does.

[Lorenci] The electoral campaign has already started in a way. What tactics do you anticipate from the opposition?

[Drnovsek] The opposition is trying to portray everything that the government is doing as bad. And it will probably do this even more relentlessly in the electoral year. Foreign policy will evidently be the agreed subject of concentrated attacks. This is bad because, in this sphere, we cross the national interests of Slovenia. Speaking of the European Union and Italy, attacks on government foreign policy are exactly what is wanted on the other side of the border. If we were, for example, to sign a compromise with the Italians and yield to them to a degree in order to gain EU associate membership, everybody would attack us tremendously. If we do not do so, they attack us for not being capable of securing associate membership. The situation is the same in relations with Croatia. In short, whatever we do, they always attack us. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] I have already asked Foreign Minister Thaler a similar question, now let me ask you, too: Since independence, foreign policy has been a sort of parade horse of the authorities. Now, as it seems, it is slowly turning into the opposite—a story about failure?

[Drnovsek] I would not agree with this. Our foreign policy is not unsuccessful. First, we are all forgetting that we are a new and small country. In light of this, we are acting pretty well and defending Slovenia's interests abroad rather successfully. There are some problems, especially regarding Italy and Croatia, which are difficult, objectively speaking. We are negotiating hard with both countries and successfully maintaining an equilibrium. Italy is trying to systematically convince our media and our public that we are in a desperate situation, that nobody in Europe cares about us, that our diplomacy is bad.... They are trying to break us psychologically. However, as I said, we are fighting them hard and on an equal footing. We made quite a lot of fuss on the European and the international scene, and this case is now widely known. In doing so, we in a way also promoted Slovenia as the most successful country in the transition, which Italy is trying to block in an unprincipled fashion. Therefore, paradoxically, the conflict with Rome has a certain promotional element to it.

I will not criticize our media, even less the journalists, as they say that it is very unwise to do so. However, it appears that in the media everything that is supposed to be negative becomes a big story, while whatever is positive is not interesting. Here, we should have a more critical attitude and a little more confidence, as well as understanding of what the Slovene national interests are and on what occasions they are trying to demoralize us psychologically or through the media.

[Lorenci] A priori negativism is unnecessary and harmful. However, we must write about problems. As for Italy, it has the right to veto our entry into the European Union, and it is clear that other EU members will not venture into dramatic conflicts with Rome over it....

[Drnovsek] So, you think that we should yield to Italy?

[Lorenci] I do not know. I believe that now even the best move would be a bad one and that there is no truly good one. In many ways, we have ended up in a dead end street and, regarding Italy, through our own mistake. Borut Pahor [acting president of the parliamentary commission for international relations] is probably right when he says that we did not act consistently regarding Italy. Initially, we promised certain things to Italy that we did not have to. Had we stood firm, Italy would have now accepted things as self-explanatory. On the other hand, we should, as Pahor says, behave with more tact toward the European Union and, therefore, liberalize real estate legislation.

[Drnovsek] This is a very superficial simplification and shows ignorance about the facts and the events. This government has never promised anything....

[Lorenci] I am speaking of Slovene policy as a whole.

[Drnovsek] The mistake was when Lojze Peterle, the outgoing foreign minister of the time, agreed to the Aquileia agreement. Because of this, we have had many problems. The government could not uphold the agreement that a minister, who had already resigned, had initialed with Italy. Otherwise, our policy was extremely consistent and consistently on the line of Europe. We wrapped up the negotiations with the European Union very rapidly. We proposed the change of the Constitution because the European Union expected this from us. In connection with this, a statement by European Commission President Santer (which the Italians are always trying to cover with something) is very clear, namely, that all other EU members support Slovenia. We fulfilled all the European criteria. Now we said again that we also accept the Spanish proposals, which represented the proposals of the European Commission. The only sticking point is Italy.

[Lorenci] What shall we do about it?

[Drnovsek] Let me first answer another criticism. I believe that we have been fighting very consistently

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and that we encounter problems because of domestic criticism, which is music to the ears of the Italians in their assertion that our position is hopeless and that we have no other choice but to accept their demands. We are not on a dead end street. Regarding Europe, we have not missed anything. We have steady nerves, and they have not failed us. We remain in the first circle for full-fledged EU membership. The conclusions of the Madrid summit and the statements of Chirac, Kohl, and others confirm this. Therefore, everything is still in the game. The game is going on. We can end it at the last moment, when we assess: Now it is truly a question of Slovenia missing the train for Europe or catching it. Everybody in Slovenia is losing his nerve now in the grip of panic. However, we will play this game until the end to the point when it will really become dead serious. Until then, we will defend the Slovene position and its interests in the best possible way. We will know how to judge when the moment comes and will also say so.

I believe that some major shifts will occur soon. Bigger countries became involved that are exerting powerful pressure on Italy. Slovenia will probably have to accept a compromise, too. There will be no absolute winner, there will probably be a compromise agreement within the European solution. However, there is no reason for the panic that is reflected in your question.

[Lorenci] There is no panic in the question. You yourself contributed to unnecessary anxiety when you flirted with a referendum recently. I, too, believe that there is still plenty of time....

[Drnovsek] Wait a minute. One must first understand why a certain statement was made. What does a referendum mean? It is interesting that as long I did not speak about it, others shouted 'why don't we have a referendum,' but as soon as I mentioned it, they became afraid of it. Let me repeat. If we assess in a given moment that vital Slovene interests are at stake and that we must make a decision at this point as we would otherwise miss the train, then it seems right to me to ask the Slovenes for their opinion. I mean, perhaps we will have to pay a price for entry into the European Union that we are not quite sure the Slovenes are willing to pay. In short, a referendum! On the other hand, this would also be a unique form of pressure on Europe and Italy. Such a situation would perhaps lead us into a position where the Slovenes would say: Europe yes, Italy no. It would become crystal clear that we accept all European conditions but that Italy is coming out with unprincipled demands that involve a correction of the past, and so forth, which Europe rejects in principle. This question would probably escalate, and Europe would perhaps be compelled to define its principles in practice and somehow regulate this issue. This is the extreme variant, which would put the positions of all three sides clearly on the table. Then everybody would have to deal with this problem, solve it, and abandon the pragmatic sweeping under the carpet. It would probably also determine EU practice for the future. This is the extreme case. And this is also useful as an element of pressure, so that the other side would perhaps nevertheless make a greater effort to find a solution that would also be acceptable for us, and all this before we reach the point I was talking about.

[Lorenci] It is probably clear to all in Europe who are deciding about this that Italy is simply blackmailing us because it can afford to. Things are fundamentally clear—it means coming to terms with the interests of a more powerful party.

[Drnovsek] This is often not clear from the writing of our media. Italy is trying to systematically portray Slovenia as not being mature enough to meet the European criteria and not wanting to embrace them. The Europeans can accept this for pragmatic reasons, to have peace on the home front. The Italians are playing the card of our domestic policy and internal differences and are trying to influence us; they are talking about us being non-European, while Europe is watching all this. To prevent this from repeating itself to infinity, we can use a referendum, this powerful instrument of pressure—and that is what I am trying to tell you. It would compel the other side, Italy and Europe, to face it squarely and confront it, also at the international media level. I expect that, also because of this pressure, we can perhaps find an acceptable compromise, that we can sustain and solve this problem.

[Lorenci] Is it not too early for a referendum? It is perfectly clear what the reply of the people would be if it involved land or real estate. Aren't such matters handled differently, namely, that the government tries to push through a project in a package until the very last moment and only then decides for a referendum?

[Drnovsek] And that is exactly what this government is doing, it has been trying to bring this project to an end for a year and a half. And you are all losing your nerve. If we cannot bring the project to an end in a satisfactory manner, we will, at the key point of decision making about Slovenia's fate—Europe yes or no, and what price—ask the Slovenes what they think about it. Why should a referendum be unusual if it involves a key national decision? Should the government assume responsibility for the country getting into the European Union 10 or 20 years later? [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Do you think that we should look at alternatives to the European Union?

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[Drnovsek] There is no real alternative to the European Union. The European Union means 70 percent of the foreign market for us and, for this sheer quantity alone, nobody can actually replace the European Union. The alternative can only be secured access to the EU market, like Switzerland and Norway have, for example, and then we can ponder whether it pays to proceed toward formal full-fledged membership or not. This is a sensible debate. As you can see, in Norway, too, they have decided against membership for the second time. The only question is whether our present trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union is sufficient. We would like to have a firmer institutionalized framework. If access to the joint European market was also possible without full membership, then this would, in principle, satisfy the vital interests of Slovenia. The present cooperation agreement gives us this access, however, institutionally speaking it is not sufficiently firm and it does not give long-term guarantees. That is why we are trying to secure a more reliable, lasting, and firmer access to the European Union market, on an equal footing with the others. I am only thinking inside these parameters and not about replacing the European Union with something else. CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Agreement], EFTA [European Free Trade Association], and suchlike can be useful, however, nothing can replace the European Union.

[Lorenci] Irrespective of Italy, we must probably brace for the possibility of having to wait a long time for our integration into the European Union because the development of the European alliance is unpredictable.

[Drnovsek] This has been a big problem so far. There are big differences among the European Union members themselves. That is also one of the reasons why we continued to postpone our final decision and negotiations. Because, it could happen that we would have to agree to very harsh conditions for associate membership, and then the EU expansion would not happen at all and we would merely remain associate members, which is not at all what we want. At the Madrid summit, they made a step forward regarding this, although the timetable for expansion is still not entirely clear and firm. However, there is something that is more important than all this together. If Slovenia continues its successful economic development, it does not lose anything but remains in the game to be the first new EU member. We are the least problematic country for new membership. This is our distinct advantage. If we can maintain it over the next few years, it will be by far our strongest trump card.

[Lorenci] In the New Year interview for the DELO Saturday supplement last year, you assessed 1994 as a real achievement in the economic sense. How do you view 1995?

[Drnovsek] In 1994 we achieved a breakthrough for the first time. The economic growth was strong, the social product increased by 5.3 percent, inflation was 18 percent, and all other parameters were rather favorable, too.

In 1995 we continued such development. The social product will increase slightly less than in the previous year, however, it will be on a higher basis. It is estimated that it will grow by 4.8 percent, that is, close to 5 percent, which was our goal. At the same time, we probably made the crucial break in reducing inflation this year. Last year's inflation was cut by a little more than half, and it will be about 8.5 percent this year. This is an achievement especially because inflation in the region of 20 percent, which we had before, is very stubborn and hard to bring under 10 percent. Some countries needed decades for that. I believe that we can describe 1995 as economically successful. It is difficult to achieve both economic growth and a reduction in inflation. The growth in industrial production has slowed a little over the past few months, however, industry in general has increasingly smaller share in the structure of our economy, and other sectors are marking stronger growth.....

[Lorenci] Has Slovenia been deindustrializing itself in the last few years?

[Drnovsek] That is correct. The biggest restructuring affected some classical industrial branches. There were problems because, for a while, the Slovene tolar was pronouncedly overvalued, which hurt exporters and also production. Such a pronouncedly monetarist policy always affects production. For quite some time, the central bank insisted on a more pronounced monetarist policy, which benefited the financial sectors more, while it affected production, especially industrial production. These trends have now changed slightly. They are again more favorable for the exporters. At the same time, we are passing the 1996 budget measures, which will unburden the economy with the reduction of their contributory rate from 44.7 percent to 42 percent. This is our response to the criticism about an expensive state. When the governent took over in 1992, the contributions amounted to 50.5 percent and now, as I said, they will be 42 percent. This is a big step forward and a good incentive for the competitiveness of the economy. In 1996 it will be easier to achieve our goal—the growth of the social product by 5 percent again. This would be the third consecutive 5-percent increase, which is extremely good because inflation has been decreasing

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all this time and is expected to do so in the coming year, also.

[Lorenci] Unemployment, therefore, remains the critical point?

[Drnovsek] Unemployment is a problem throughout the European Union, a structural problem that cannot be resolved in the short run. Unemployment in Slovenia has been alleviated to a degree. If we look at European statistics, our unemployment is 7.6 percent while the average unemployment in the European Union is 10.5 percent. This figure will keep us company for quite some time, and, with constant economic growth, we will bring it down a little. Slovenia's specific trait is that even formally unemployed people receive incomes.

[Lorenci] Has the core of our economic and development problems has remained the same over the past few years—too high salaries and too expensive pensions and medical care systems?

[Drnovsek] We must first ask ourselves whether the fact that salaries are relatively high is good or bad. The majority of Slovenes think that it is not bad to have relatively high salaries as, ultimately, part of the economic competitiveness also derives from the domestic demand and greater incomes and salaries. Over the past few years, we have tried to arrange that the growth of salaries would not lag behind the increase in productivity. We have been more or less successful in this, and this is also our goal for the future. The economic theoreticians see this as overtly simplistic, namely, they say, let us tighten our belts and reduce salaries by so much and then we will have the following increase in savings, investments, and growth. It looks very simple as an equation on paper, but it is different in practice. In France, for example, where they ventured into such corrections, the state was immediately paralyzed for three weeks and the losses ultimately exceeded the possible benefits. [passage omitted]

[Lorenci] Could you briefly assess the year that is running out and tell us what you expect from the coming one?

[Drnovsek] 1995 was overall a good year. It was economically successful. Slovenia continued to reaffirm itself as an independent country, as a country that is developing in the atmosphere of an economic and social equilibrium that, I repeat, is not always necessarily the case. Despite numerous problems that we must resolve as a country in transition and as a country in an unfavorable international environment next to unpleasant neighbors, we developed successfully as a young state. The political scene in 1996 will probably be even more complex and grating because we will have elections at the end of the year. There will be numerous attacks, quarrels, accusations, and perhaps it will sometimes be difficult to maintain a distance from events and make the right conclusions about what is going on. However, it seems to me that the measures that we are passing parallel to the budget will safeguard the frameworks that will economically facilitate a step forward, despite the political fights. In 1996 we will probably see the outcome of the conflict with Italy and the European Union. Over the next few months, this will be quite a popular topic. The second half of the year will be in the sign of elections. I am convinced that Slovenia is sufficiently mature and firm to remain politically stable and economically successful, and also that we will be able to secure wider security for Slovenia.

[Lorenci] Regarding transition, do you think that we are past the worst and anywhere near its end?

[Drnovsek] I think so. This was a complicated period. However, we have accomplished many things. The new economic structure has been set up. However, the system will only begin to function normally after the completion of privatization. We are nearing its end. All these mechanisms that we had to set up anew will then assume their normal dynamics and will start bringing positive results. Now, at the beginning, the negative effects often prevail. I hope the positive effects will prevail later, especially in terms of effectiveness, which is why we changed over to this system in the first place.

[Lorenci] Thank you for the interview, Mr. Prime Minister.

National Party Criticizes NATO Transit Agreement

AU0401164996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zmago Jelincic, president of the Slovene National Party, deemed an agreement between Slovenia and NATO on the transit of NATO units to Bosnia-Herzegovina unacceptable. He said that we have renounced our sovereignty, law, and security with this agreement and on the other hand also lost a lot of money.

He accused the government of bypassing the parliament in the preparation of the document, being well aware that the deputies would not support it in the ordinary procedure as the signing of this agreement rendered us a sort of a colony.

This was supposedly also demonstrated by the attitude of the U.S. ambassador to Slovenia, who did not find it worthwhile to attend the ceremonial session of the parliament, marking the anniversary of the [independence] plebiscite.

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Federal

Europe Plans To Repatriate 700,000 Refugees

LD0401133796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1228 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 4 (TANJUG)—Europe is planning with haste the repatriation of of 700,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

A recent attempt by Germany to start sending back refugees was halted personsally by U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, who demanded a postponement on account of the cold winter.

Germany has received about 350,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

Among the countries that have received tens of thousands of refugees are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Switzerland and England.

The UNHCR has to make preparations for the return of displaced persons who have sought temporary refuge in western European countries, as part of the program for repatriating about three million refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

The program envisages their return in three stages. First refugees and displaced persons within Bosnia would be sent back, then refugees from the former Yugoslav republics, and finally, those from Europe.

The institute of temporary protection is no novelty, but has been systemmatically elaborated since the first conference on the former Yugoslavia on July 29, 1992, with advantages and temporary guarantees.

A recently published study condition of refugees worldwide - in quest of solutions, shows the UNHCR to be faced with the dilemma whether temporary protection becomes a permanent asylum for thousands of refugees, and who is to say when conditions are met for their return and to assess where they would be the safest.

The UNHCR, entrusted under the Dayton accord with the return of refugees from the former Yugoslavia, has to deal with the question of those who have lost temporary protection, but do not wish to return, or those whose homes are in territory controlled by the other side.

According to the UNHCR, temporary protection might be extended to those whose native country refuses to take back, and in cases when the country of asylum and the native country come to terms in regard to this question.

Other exceptions would include refugees receiving such medical care that they could not have in their native country (victims of torture, sexual abuse and those who need special treatment, persons with serious physical and mental disorders) as well as refugees who would be separated from other members of their families.

Repatriation will also depend on normalization of life after peace is established in the war-torn former Yugoslavia.

Official Denies Phone Lines With Bosnia Restored

LD0401155396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1508 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Jan (Tanjug)—Telephone lines between the FRY and the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not been restored, Slobodan Radovanovic, assistant director general of Serbia PTT [Post, Telegraph, and Telecommunications], told Tanjug.

Reacting to reports by world agencies and TV stations that telephone lines between Belgrade and Sarajevo have been restored, Radovanovic explained that the link was possible only via the telephone systems of neighboring countries.

According to Serbia PTT, the public would be told promptly once the telephone link between Belgrade and Sarajevo is restored.

Serbia

Draskovic Says Peace Depends on World Community

LD0401201696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1936 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 4 (TANJUG)—Serbia's opposition official Vuk Draskovic said Thursday that the maintaining of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina depended solely on the international community.

The president of the opposition Serbian renewal movement told a press conference that the international community was the only hope for putting into effect what had been agreed in Dayton and Paris because the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs were doing everything to prove that they could no longer live together.

He said that Bosnia-Herzegovina could only be saved if it was placed under an uncompromising international tutorship.

He said a possible evacuation of Serbs from Sarajevo would be a victory for the idea that life together was no longer possible anywhere.

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Commentary on 'Troubled Atmosphere' in E. Slavonia

AU0301200696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jan 96 p 7

[Commentary by M.B.: "Suitcases Packed—Guns at the Ready"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Army trucks with the registration plates of the Srem-Baranja Corps of the Serb Army of Krajina can still be seen cruising the streets of Belgrade. The officers of this corps can frequently be seen in their camouflage uniforms sitting in elite Belgrade restaurants in the company of the former but still active Krajina ministers of defense and police, Milan Suput and Tosa Pajic, and full mobilization is still in effect in the Srem-Baranja region.

Under arms and with packed suitcases, the people in this region welcomed in the New Year and UN administrator Jacques Klein [name as received], who is supposed to make sure that the Erdut agreement is implemented with the help of international forces. This agreement, signed almost two months ago, seems not to have resulted in any changes on the ground. The Croatian regime is facing (on top of the Croatian Democratic Community debacle in the Zagreb city elections and the great dissatisfaction of the opposition and refugees from eastern Slavonia) the possibility of this region being populated by Serbs from Krajina. One hears more and more frequently assessments such as those by Tomac and Kramaric that it would have been better for Croatia if the Serbs had remained scattered all over Krajina rather than having them concentrated in the border area where, with Serbia just behind them, they could become a strong "destabilizing factor."

Such views are gaining in importance, particularly since Veselin Pejnovic appealed resolutely to the expelled Krajina people to settle en masse in eastern Slavonia. His appeal was most probably not a chance one nor made out of spite, particularly when one keeps in mind that Pejnovic heads the Serbian People's Party Committee in Zagreb, which is working on the return of the Serbs to Croatia and whose activities are financed by the U.S. Embassy. It is also not by chance that articles have started appearing in the Croatian press announcing a new "Storm" operation and an onslaught by the Croatian Army eastwards in February this year.

On the other hand, the leaders of the Srem-Baranja Serbs, in their interpretation of the Erdut agreement, believe that this document leaves open the possibility for them to win some kind of autonomy by diplomatic means. Slavko Dokmanovic recently formed the executive council of the region, and he also took advantage of the atmosphere created by the condemnation of the Croatian regime for the crimes in Krajina and its obstruction of the return of expelled Serbs. He went even further and, in addressing international mediators and the UN Security Council, he openly questioned even the implementation and validity of the agreement. He was also encouraged by the UN Security Council presidential statement, which carries the toughest condemnation of Tudjman's policy so far, and—according to many people—represents the last step before sanctions are imposed.

This troubled atmosphere is somewhat heated by the United Nations' reluctance to define the mandate for implementating the agreement, but also by the delay in the mutual recognition and normalization of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade. This delay has been explained by differences over Prevlaka, but those in the know claim that the solution and status of the Srem-Baranja region are also a bone of contention.

This theory can be verified by the FRY foreign minister's statement that Prevlaka is neither the only problem nor the greatest one. The problem seems to be in some "minor" details, or perhaps the time is not yet right for realizing the agreement on the exchange of territory, which is obviously approved of and supervised by some important world factors.

However, the drawing of new maps to simplify the "leopard's skin" with exchanges of national population that have lived mixed together for centuries is proving more and more a complicated and unachievable job. This is confirmed by Croatian reluctance to settle in the former most westward Serb state, as well as by Krajina Serb reluctance to settle along the Danube River or in Kosovo. The project for repatriation of refugees in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly the chances for its success, are again making topical the possibility of a more massive return of the Serbs to Croatia, if not immediately to their former addresses then at least to the eastern part of the former Republic of Serb Krajina.

Whether this is where some of the reasons for the suspension of the heated Zagreb-Belgrade negotiations lie will be shown in January, when the arrival of the international force for implementating the agreement is expected. Then something more about the establishment of the status of the Srem-Baranja region will become clearer, but the end of the story will remain unknown unless there is a blitzkrieg, as announced by Zagreb GLOBUS. [sentence as published] For the beginning, it will be enough if weapons are laid down, suitcases unpacked, and tractor carts unloaded.

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Rumors Spread About 'Bunker' at Milosevic Home

AU0401175996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jan 96 p 9

[Report by B.J.: "Bunker or Pyramid?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pozarevac—We have found out from reliable sources that construction work on a facility for an unknown purpose is under way in the garden of the family home of the Milosevic-Markovic couple.

The grandiose dimensions of the foundations of the future construction (length 20 meters, width 14 meters, and depth 15 meters) have intrigued the locals in Pozarevac and rumors are spreading around town that this is a future luxury bunker, which should enable the president to feel as at home in his birthplace as he does in Belgrade (Dobanovci).

The Zavrsni Radovi construction company, whose director is Dragojlo Stoiljkovic, brother of Serbian Chamber of Commerce chairman Vlajko Stoiljkovic, has been hired to build this construction (wicked tongues are calling it The Pyramid because of Milosevic's nickname The Pharaoh). By the way, the "bunker under construction" can be quite plainly seen from the street even though the garden is surrounded by a wall three meters high.

Removal of Belgrade Radio-TV Chief Predicted

AU0401212996 Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Vladan Dinic: "SPS Spokesman Ivica Dacic Is Closest to the Chair of General Director of Radio Television of Serbia, While Current Director and Chief Editor Dragoljub Milanovic Is Either Going Into Diplomatic Service or Back to Pristina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dissension in the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], also surrounding the functioning of Radio Television of Serbia [RTS] and the (un)successful work of Milorad Vucelic, has culminated in the departure of Borisav Jovic, Mihajlo Markovic, Milorad Vucelic, and others, but the "struggle" for the post of chief man of the most powerful media—the RTS—is still not over. True, Dragoljub Milanovic has enjoyed the full confidence of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, but not of other very important members of the SPS Main Committee and leadership. So, in order "to keep peace in the house," a new man is needed to head RTS.

TELEGRAF sources claim that Dragoljub Milanovic is at the end of his "rule" in Takovska Street 10. The most serious candidate for his replacement, maybe even before the SPS congress in March, is young SPS Spokesman Ivica Dacic. However, one should not underestimate the chances of the eternal Ratomir Vico, or "the expelled" (after the 1991 March events) Dusan Mitevic, or Aleksandar Avramovic, who managed to stabilize the situation in the RTS after Vuk Draskovic and the demonstrators threatened to "knock down TV Bastille."

At the moment, none of the above mentioned want to either confirm or deny the rumors about Takovska Street 10. Obviously, many of them have been burnt before, so now they are cautious, but, to judge by the behavior of the RTS Information Department, it seem certain that they are preparing to forget Dragoljub Milanovic and adjust to a new boss. People acquainted with the situation in RTS believe that "the time of peace" and the time of a serious election campaign are coming, so Dragoljub Milanovic has to go as soon as possible.

This is not because he has done something wrong, at least not in the eyes of those who decide, but because new times require a new man who will manage to calm down the embittered opposition (particularly after the ban on TV broadcasting of assembly sessions) and yo convince the wider TV audience of the correctness of the SPS post-Dayton policy, that is, to present those successes in the best possible manner and more professionally than the current director and chief editor has managed.

Dragoljub Milanovic's merits will of course not be forgotten. As sources from the RTS and SPS leadership indicate, he will most likely become a diplomat, although it is possible that he might be sent back to Pristina "to sort out things" there.

Kosovo

Albanian Union Voices Support for Rugova Policy

AU3012161995 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 27 Dec 95 p 19

[Report by the Kosova Information Center: "Support for the Peaceful Policy of the Albanian Leader"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prishtina, 26 December (QIK)—The second election assembly of the Democratic Union of Albanians [UDSh] was held in Ulqin yesterday, attended by the party delegates from Malesi e Madhe and Ulqin branches as well as representatives of the Albanian associations and the Islamic community of the city.

UDSh Secretary General Nike Palkola spoke about the UDSh two-year activity, pointing out the party's work during this period as well as the great difficulties it has been and is still being confronted with.

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Palkola also spoke about the UDSh cooperation with the Albanian parties in Kosova and Albania and singled out the unreserved support of this party for the peaceful policy of the chairman of the Republic of Kosova, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.

Focusing on the directions of the UDSh's further action, Mr. Palkola drew the attention that this party will constitute its branches in other Albanian areas in Montenegro and diaspora.

The UDSh demands from the other political and non-political subjects to be assisted in its commitment to prevent the construction of the military base in Valdanos Bay, Palkola said, criticizing all those who have not reacted in this direction.

The assembly approved the report on the party's two-year activity, some substitutions and amendments to the party statute, as well as passed the UDSh political resolution.

The delegates elected the new leadership by secret voting. Professor Bajram Rexha was again reelected chairman, while Fuad Nimani and Luigj M. Juncaj were elected deputy chairmen. Nike Palkola was elected general secretary, a post that he has been holding so far.

Serb Refugees List Property Left in Croatia

LD0401161296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1209 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 4 Jan (TANJUG)—The collection of information on the property of refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina has begun in Kosovo-Metohija, Zvezdan Milenkovic, commissioner for refugees in Kosovo-Metohija, told TANJUG today.

Forms for setting out detailed information about the property of those who had to leave their homes in Krajina have been distributed to most municipalities. It is expected that in a few days' time all municipalities in which refugees now live will obtain the requisite documents. A precise deadline for notifying the authorities has not been set, but Milenkovic says, it is necessary to complete the documentation on this property as soon as possible.

This information will then be passed on to the Federal Justice Ministry, which will put a case to the competent international institutions for the return of this property.

Otherwise, according to incomplete information, there are currently about 15,000 refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina in Kosovo-Metohija.

Commentary Denounces Autonomy Proposals

AU0501091196 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 3 Jan 96 pp 4-5

[Unattributed commentary: "Proposals for Autonomy Are Not in Conformity with the Great Political Achievements of the Kosovar People"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] During the past two months, before and after the talks in Dayton in the United States, several Albanian circles also started to speculate on resolving the Kosovo issue with a political status of a broad autonomy. The Albanian press put forward to the public two proposals on the Kosovo autonomy: One was attributed to Serbian chairman Milosevic and the other to the Contact Group (of the five most influential countries in the world). However, it came out that these speculations originated from Serbian circles.

As the Kosovo problem and its representatives were not present in the international conferences on former Yugoslavia which were held during November and December, and due to speculations regarding the solution to the Kosovo issue, the representatives of institutions, political parties, and numerous associations reiterated once again the well-known stance that autonomy for Kosovo within the framework of Serbia or the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia means robbery and war against Albanians.

These stances, although they may seem redundant repetitions to some, are conveyed and carefully analyzed by international factors. During the visit of the chairman of the Republic of Kosovo Dr. Ibrahim Rugova to the United States, the term autonomy was almost never mentioned as a solution for Kosovo. In an article in the BUJKU newspaper, a participant in the talks confirmed that Mr. Christopher had stated that modalities for the solution of the Kosovo issue have not been formulated.

In Germany, Dr. Rugova was received by Foreign Minister Kinkel. Germany aims at playing a lot more active role than so far in the crisis in the Balkan region, while its officials chair several working groups on former Yugoslavia, such as the case with Mr. Ahrens who presided over the group for Kosovo at the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. Mr. Kinkel said clearly that the problem of Kosovo should currently be at the focus of interest of the international community. The meeting and several other circumstances were, however, misinterpreted to the point of absurdity in some articles in the newspapers, even stating that, during the talks with Mr. Kinkel, Dr. Rugova had allegedly consented to the status of an autonomy for Kosovo.

Under such circumstances, i.e. the declaration of Albanians for independence and speculations by journal-

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ists (unfortunately Albanians), President Berisha visited Germany and gave several statements for the solution to the Kosovo problem with a status of autonomy. Because of the context in which these statements were articulated and due to their content, the statements bothered the public and the Albanian politics in Kosovo. However, at Rinas Airport, Dr. Rugova clearly stated that the solution to the Kosovo issue should be sought on the basis of the political will of the people. Meanwhile, avoiding any kind of confrontation with Tirana, the Democratic League of Kosovo and several other political parties in Kosovo reiterated their well-known stance on resolving the Kosovo issue by respecting the political will for independence. [passage omitted]

Autonomy as Incentive for Conflicts]

[Passage omitted] It was not possible to force Albanians to acquiesce in robbery at times when Albanians had objectively been weaker than today, that is why it is an illusion to think that autonomy within the framework of Serbia or the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia can be a solution acceptable to Albanians.

Over the past ten years, with its powerful political movement, Kosovo has created its identity that has been affirmed worldwide. The power of the political movement and that of Kosovo relies on the determination of the people and their might and in the democratic procedures for expressing the political will and choosing representatives from the people.

Albanians in Kosovo have so far shown themselves to be very attentive and have preserved and cultivated these mechanisms and procedures with sacrifices and a high national and civil consciousness.

These procedures exclude the acceptance of any solutions for Kosovo which do not comply with the political will for independence of the Republic of Kosovo. Proposals for autonomy, return of autonomy, and others are not in conformity with these great political achievements of the people of Kosovo. [passage omitted]

Commentary Says RTSh Pursuing Berisha's 'Line'

AU0401192596

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian on 3 January on page 2 carries a 500-word report by M. Krasniqi under the headline "The RTSh Lecture for Kosovars?" commenting on the failure of Albanian Radio-Television (RTSh) on New Year's eve to broadcast a festive program via satellite for the Albanians living and working abroad and for the ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo. The commentary opens by stating that "The RTSh was the culminating point of desperation for an Albanian in the Republic of Kosova at the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996."

The commentary continues: "One comment that is heard in Kosova regarding this topic is that, in this way, the RTSh followed the political line of Sali Berisha, who has recently made a great fuss in the search for autonomy for Kosova, even though, as far as it is known here, no one has given him such a mandate on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians. These comments suggest that the television of the autonomist Berisha exploited the opportunity to send an indirect signal to the Albanians of Kosova on New Year to turn to Belgrade, just as President Berisha would prefer them to do. As there are such terribly bitter experiences of the past, such comments find considerable room in Kosova even for the belief that it is being orchestrated on the course and under the control of the first man in Albania."

The commentary states further that people in Kosova "blame the Government of the Republic of Kosova for not finding an opportunity to provide information on the lack of festive programs in the Albanian satellite broadcast." Reproaching the Kosovar authorities, the commentary further asks them to "seek out other arrangements to create an informative and entertaining space for its nationals."

Concluding, Krasniqi suggests that the RTSh "owes" something to the Albanian viewers due to its "prestige" and in order to "block speculations and desperate suppositions."

Vojvodina

Ethnic Hungarians Urge Amnesty for Draft Dodgers

LD0401180496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1105 GMT 4 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Jan (BETA)—Sandor Egeresi, the executive vice president of the Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [SVM], has said that any person that left the country in order to avoid having to take part in the war should be allowed to return to the country without threat of any consequences.

Speaking to BETA, he said that the SVM fully supported any initiative to have a law passed granting amnesty and annulling the offense. According to Egeresi, such a law should have been passed as early as 1992 or 1993.

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According to SVM estimates, in the 1991-94 period between 35,000 and 40,000 [ethnic] Hungarians left Vojvodina. "They left because they did not want to take part in the fratricidal war among the south Slavs," Egeresi said.

Egeresi said that, according to SVM figures, in the same period over 200,000 mainly young professionals left Serbia.

They should all be allowed to return, Egeresi said. He noted that last September the SVM put out a declaration calling for an amnesty law but "unfortunately no other party or democratically-oriented movement reacted."

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